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Toward a New Model for Securities Law Enforcement
Cristie L. Ford1
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The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or
the Commission) expanded its mandate in recent years, in the wake of
multiple scandals: its Enforcement Division (Enforcement) was no longer
satisfied with punishing wrongdoing, but through the specter of prosecution
intended to effect compliance change to internal controls, supervisory
procedures, and compliance functions on an “enormous scale,” and to
motivate “long-term” change in corporate behavior. In effect, the quotes
from senior SEC officers with which this paper opens suggest that
Enforcement has been aspiring to changing corporate culture.4 The SEC has
not only emphasized the necessity of having a “culture of compliance,” but
expressed awareness of and concern for companies’ “moral DNA.”5
Enforcement’s approach to this goal has been characterized, above
all, by increasingly massive monetary penalties levied against firms—that is,
against public companies and regulated entities.6 Under Chairman William
H. Donaldson, who resigned in June of this year, the SEC initiated
enforcement actions against more organizations and imposed more and
larger civil penalties than at any time in its seven-decade history.7 These
extraordinary fines were combined with a published SEC protocol that
allowed firms to bid for leniency in settlements, in exchange for cooperating
with Enforcement after apparent wrongdoing has been uncovered, and/or for
having in place an internal compliance program.
Yet each of the SEC’s recent strategies—massive monetary
sanctions and a settlement protocol that permits bargaining for leniency on
the terms above—was inadequate if the goal was sincerely to motivate longterm change in firm behavior. First, monetary penalties do not address the
thornier problems of institutional culture except in the most accidental way.
While optimal penalties (to the extent that optimality can be identified) may
deter companies from engaging in open and clearly law-violating conduct,
4

A similar observation could be made about criminal securities law enforcement, but that
must be the subject of another paper. Michael Chertoff, Former Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division, Department of Justice, has reportedly expressed the view that criminal
prosecution, also, can be “a spur for institutional reform.” Michael Chertoff, Speech at the
ABA Criminal Justice Section’s 17th Annual National Institute on White Collar Crime, (Mar.
2003), as recorded by John Gibeaut, Junior G-Men: Corporate Lawyers Worry That They’re
Doing the Government’s Bidding While Doing Internal Investigations, 89-JUN A.B.A. J. 46
(June 2003). See also infra note 11.
5
See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
6
I use the terms “organizations” and “firms” to refer collectively to public companies and
other regulated entities subject to the SEC’s enforcement jurisdiction. For clarity’s sake, I
periodically employ terms such as “corporate governance” or “corporate citizen,” but I mean
those terms to apply to regulated entities as well.
7
See infra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
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they are unpredictable as a tool for effecting ambitious cultural change.
Because deterrence effects are inscrutable, massive deterrence looks like the
last resort of the regulator who has given up trying to identify, or address,
root causes of social and economic problems in any more systematic way.
This is not to say that deterrence-based mechanisms may not be useful in
effecting widespread reforms; only that they are insufficient on their own,
and potentially unwieldy.
Second, the SEC’s settlement protocol, called the “Framework for
Cooperation,”8 does not advance and may even undermine the stated goal of
promoting good corporate governance. Specifically, it is not the case that
either of the Framework’s criteria—having in place a compliance program,
and/or cooperating with Enforcement ex post—is a reliable indicator of
good corporate citizenship. In fact, for the worst offenders, cooperating
with authorities can be a mechanism for scapegoating individuals and
avoiding organizational responsibility. Extending leniency to firms that
have a compliance program in place can mean in practice that formulaic and
facial compliance indicia substitute for evidence that a real “culture of
compliance” exists.
If the SEC is serious about spurring institutional reform, it will need
enforcement tools that are better suited to its purpose. Interestingly, during
Chairman Donaldson’s era, Enforcement also roughed out the promising
beginnings of a new, or resurgent, model in what I call the “Reform
Undertaking.”
Under a Reform Undertaking arrangement, SEC
Enforcement and the firm enter into a settlement agreement relating to an
action that Enforcement has initiated for violation of the securities laws.
One term of the settlement agreement is that the firm shall retain, at its own
expense, an independent third party monitor (the “Third Party”) to oversee
its compliance processes and procedures for a period of time after the
settlement has been concluded.9 The Reform Undertaking model has
8

See infra Part 2.
The Reform Undertaking shares key features with another innovation in federal criminal
prosecution: the organizational Deferred Prosecution Agreement. Like the Reform
Undertaking, the typical Deferred Prosecution Agreement requires firms to adopt internal
controls designed to deter potential violations of firm policies and procedures, and to
cooperate with an independent third party monitor who will report at intervals to the
Department of Justice. Failure to abide by the terms satisfactorily over the span of the
deferral results in prosecution. See, e.g., Press Release, Department of Justice, America
Online Charged with Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud; Prosecution Deferred for Two
Years (Dec. 15, 2004), http://www.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel04/aolrelease121504.htm;
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Computer Associates Int’l, Inc., Cr. No.
04-837 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2004), http://www.ca.com/about/dpa/def_pros_agreement.pdf;
Press Release, Department of Justice, PNC ICLC Corp. Enters Into Deferred Prosecution
Agreement with the United States (June 2, 2003),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/June/03_crm_329.htm. The Department of Justice also
incorporated auditing mechanisms and structural changes to its Enron-related settlements
9
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important advantages over more traditional settlement approaches in that it
uncouples the acute enforcement action from the specifics of reform
measures, thereby reducing some of the pressure toward strategic action. It
goes beyond a pure deterrence model and tries to investigate “corporate
culture,” by making firm actors agents of their own change, in a way that it
is more transparent and accountable than the existing Framework for
Cooperation approach.
Some things are likely to change under new SEC Chairman
Christopher Cox. For example, he is likely to discontinue the substantial
monetary penalties levied against organizations that became controversial in
the last months of Chairman Donaldson’s tenure.10 On the other hand, the
published SEC protocol mentioned above, which allows firms to bid for
leniency, is likely to persist since the philosophy underlying it—that firms
should be rewarded for cooperating with Enforcement and for having
internal compliance programs in place—has not been seriously questioned.
We should also expect the Reform Undertaking model, as an alternative to
heavy monetary fines, to increase in currency under Chairman Cox.
Chairman Cox is generally understood to be a strong ally of business
community interests, which have opposed what they perceive as overzealous
regulation under Chairman Donaldson.11 The Reform Undertaking model is
theoretically consistent with a more decentralized, industry-driven
regulatory agenda.
Less obvious but just as important is that, when properly
implemented, the Reform Undertaking model may contain the power,
unanticipated by advocates of industry-driven regulation, to effect verifiable
positive change to a firm’s culture, institutions, and long-term behavior.
This paper explores and then extrapolates from the Reform Undertaking,
informed in part by “new governance” or “experimentalist” theory,12 to
sketch the directions in which the Reform Undertaking must go if it is to
have a real chance of effecting such change. By relating SEC Enforcement
with CIBC and Merrill Lynch. Letter from Leslie R. Caldwell, Director, Enron Task Force,
Department of Justice, to Gary Naftalis, Esq. (Dec. 22, 2003),
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/chargingdocs/cibcagreement.pdf; Letter from Leslie R.
Caldwell, Director, Enron Task Force, Department of Justice, to Robert S. Morvillo, Esq. and
Charles Stillman, Esq. (Sept. 17, 2003),
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/chargingdocs/merrill_lynchagreement.pdf. See also Off the
Hook: Deferred Prosecution Agreements on the Rise, 48 CORP. CRIME REP. 1, (Dec. 10,
2004). While Deferred Prosecution Agreements work on a similar model and deserve their
own analysis, they are beyond the scope of this paper.
10
See Deborah Solomon & John D. McKinnon, Off the Beat: Donaldson Ends an SEC Tenure
Marked by Active Regulation, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2005, at A1. See also infra note 27 (for
criticism that the SEC’s implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404 imposed extraordinary
costs on business without corresponding benefit).
11
Id.
12
See infra notes 62-74 and accompanying text.
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practices to New Governance, I am connecting promising on-the-ground
developments that may be proceeding ad hoc, without guiding principle, to a
relevant theoretical conversation. I argue for four things above all: the need
for the Reform Undertaking to be built around a participatory firm process;
the need for Third Parties to be accountable for their methodology and
results within firms’ Reform Undertakings; the need for the SEC to develop
the information-gathering capacity to credibly evaluate Reform
Undertakings’ success; and the need to provide consistent incentives to
Enforcement personnel.
Along the way, this paper identifies the potential for a securities law
enforcement function that leverages enforcers’ one-case-at-a-time approach,
as well as their coercive powers, in the service of a more effective and more
rational regulatory project. As a mechanism for affecting corporate culture
on a broad scale, the re-imagined Enforcement compares favorably not only
with existing enforcement structures, but also with regulatory rule-making.
In this way, this paper seeks to somewhat rehabilitate the enforcement idea
among New Governance theorists. The coercive enforcement function (as
distinct from arm’s length judicial action) has been understudied and at
times undervalued by New Governance theorists. Yet frontline SEC
Enforcement staff is developing a unique experimentalist structure in the
interstices of its practice, characterized by endogenous problem solving
embedded within and buttressed by an exogenous punitive, adversarial,
compliance-oriented system. The result is more than just a variant on the
existing theoretical approach: it represents a fresh interface between a statesanctioned administrative enforcement pyramid and systemic, complex
problems like corporate cultural dysfunction. This project explores that
interface and finds reason to be optimistic, even in the context of regulatory
settlements, reached with enforcement staff, with all the real-life constraints
of capacity and method that entails.
This paper proceeds in five parts. Part One describes the limitations
of the SEC’s deterrence-based strategy in meeting the agency’s stated
intention of spurring institutional reform, and suggests that a New
Governance-style approach may be better suited to the task. It also
identifies challenges, relative to other New Governance initiatives, arising
from the securities laws’ enforcement-driven and settlement-oriented
environment. Part Two describes problems with the second component part
of the SEC’s strategy, the Framework for Cooperation, which permits firms
to bid for leniency in exchange for having in place facial indicia of
compliance, and/or for cooperating with Enforcement ex post. Part Three
describes and provides examples of the new settlement approach that I call
the Reform Undertaking. This Part sets out the Reform Undertaking’s
advantages over either pure deterrence-based mechanisms or Framework for
Cooperation-based settlements. Part Four identifies the shortcomings of the
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Reform Undertaking in its current iteration, and points to the four additional
elements it needs to be a more thoroughgoing and theoretically coherent
approach. The final Part imagines a New Governance-inflected approach to
enforcement conduct, which leverages its strengths as a hybrid enforcementoriented experimentalist form.

1. Corporate Governance and Deterrence-Based Response
Scope Concerns
This paper starts from a position that should be uncontroversial by
now: that industries, companies, and organizations have cultures of their
own; that culture affects how those organizations behave; and that certain
kinds of cultural attributes can cause organizations to behave in lawviolating ways.13 I do not attempt, nor is it necessary to completely define
“firm culture,” except to note that some organizations can be characterized
by an “insiders’ culture,” which rewards in-group loyalty at the expense of
the best interests of “outsiders,” such as general shareholders or the public.
Loyalty may take the form of keeping confidences, or making contributions
to in-group members’ income or market share by means that would be
criticized were they widely known. For example, in the securities industry,
investment advisors may fail to tell mutual fund shareholders about
excessive fees or “shelf space” commissions;14 audit firms may fail to tell an
audit client’s shareholders about conflicts of interest that could compromise
the independence of an audit;15 or investment banks may fail to tell the
public that the research analysis they produce has a remuneratory
relationship to banking business, before and after initial public offerings.16

13

See, e.g., JAMES W. COLEMAN, THE CRIMINAL ELITE (1989); KIP SCHLEGEL, JUST DESERTS
FOR CORPORATE CRIMINALS (1990); Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the

Responsibility of Corporations and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The
Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35 RUTGERS L. J. 1, 10-45 (2003) (canvassing sociolegal
literature on the relationship between social environment and individual ethical conduct).
Firms, especially the worst actors, may also be very dysfunctional in the manner described in
MAX H. BAZERMAN & MICHAEL D. WATKINS, PREDICTABLE SURPRISES: THE DISASTERS YOU
SHOULD HAVE SEEN COMING AND HOW TO PREVENT THEM 95-119 (2004). The
recommendations that follow apply equally there.
14
Richard C. Schoenstein et al., Investigations of Mutual Fund Industry Still Gathering
Steam, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 8, 2004, at 9.
15
See, e.g., In re Ernst & Young LLP, Initial Decision Release No. 249 (Apr. 16, 2004),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/aljdec/id249bpm.htm; Final Order, Securities Act Release No.
8413 (April 26, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/aljdec/33-8413.htm [hereinafter Ernst &
Young]; Cassell Bryan-Low, Did Ties That Bind Also Blind KPMG?, WALL ST. J., June 18,
2003, at C1; Floyd Norris, Andersen Told To Split Audits and Consulting, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
12, 2002, at C1.
16
Documents relating to the Global Research Analyst Settlement are collected at
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/globalsettlement.htm.

Page 6 of 72

Cultures are not monolithic, and they have as much to do with
situation and human psychology as with some notion of firm “character.”
But regardless of their provenance, the norms, customs, and rituals that arise
in tight-knit communities may create a compelling moral world for those in
it.17 Insiders’ ethical perceptions of conduct are shaped by the actions of
those around them, normalizing and even ratcheting up law-violating
conduct and marginalizing dissenters.18 In an extreme form, an “insiders’
culture” may disdain and try to circumvent inconvenient, externally imposed
regulations on issues ranging from employment discrimination, to revenue
recognition, to toxic waste disposal. Insiders’ cultures put in place,
intentionally or accretively (through situational pressures or escalation of
commitment), structures and relationships that maintain the culture’s
opacity.
Such public-harming cultures can exist notwithstanding
governance processes and compliance mechanisms that look exemplary on
paper. A classic example of this phenomenon is Enron, whose Board of
Directors voted to waive that company’s state-of-the-art conflict of interest
rules to allow CFO Andrew Fastow to make self-dealing transactions.19
WorldCom also adhered to “‘checklists’ of recommended ‘best practices.’”20
Although all organizations have cultures, and even some degree of
“insider culture,” let me be clear about the firms that are of primary concern.
They are those firms that Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, in their seminal
work Responsive Regulation, would put at or near the top of the
“enforcement pyramid”—those firms that attract the greatest enforcement
resources because other, lesser attempts at regulation have failed.21 These
17

See Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE
ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 95, 103-113, 138-144 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992).
18
See EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION 240 (1983)
(discussing how criminal behavior is learned in association with those who define such
criminal behavior favorably and in isolation from those who define it unfavorably); Kenneth
D. Butterfield et al., Moral Awareness in Business Organizations: Influences of Issue-Related
and Social Context Factors, 53 HUM. REL. 981, 999-1001 (2000) (empirical study of impact
of perceived social consensus on ethical decisionmaking). This provides a strong theoretical
justification for conspiracy laws: even where a conspiracy did not successfully complete a
criminal act, conspiracy itself is a crime because collective action emboldens individual
wrongdoers. Neal Kumar Katyar, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L. J. 1307 (2003).
19
See William C. Powers, Jr. et al., Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative
Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp. 9, 22-23, (2002),
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport/sicreport020102.pdf; see also Dallas,
supra note 13, at 45-54 (examining Enron’s ethical climate); Ernst & Young, supra note 15
(describing “sham” compliance procedures).
20
Richard C. Breeden, Restoring Trust: Report to the Hon. Jed S. Rakoff, United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, On Corporate Governance for the
Future of MCI 20, 25 (Aug. 2003),
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/worldcom/wcomreport0803.pdf.
21
Ayres and Braithwaite describe a regulatory structure in which enforcers have an escalating
scale of enforcement options at their disposal. The majority of firms, at the broad base of the
pyramid, stay in compliance with little resource expenditure by enforcers. As firm
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are the same firms whose conduct attracts (or should attract) the largest
monetary sanctions, in settlements based on serious allegations of fraud or
something close to it,22 where the degree of harm resulting from the alleged
violations is significant. Often, they are recidivists, even if past violations
are not identical to the current one. There is reason to believe (regardless of
what the firm claims) that the firm suffers from pervasive cultural or ethical
problems that are likely to persist beyond the immediate enforcement action,
but these are not utterly criminal enterprises. My preoccupation, then, is
what Christopher Stone once described as “that group of firms, impossible
to identify in advance, whose behavior in the face of realistically achievable
penalty levels will remain inadequately modified.”23 These are the “worst
actors.”
I argue below for a remedy that is more interventionist than existing
remedies, and that will impose additional costs on worst actor firms. The
firms are required to engage in a protracted remedial exercise in which they
define and apply standards-based (as opposed to narrower rule-based)
notions of good governance to their own operations. Readers may
reasonably counter that additional regulatory costs should not be imposed on
firms without some indication that the project’s benefits would outweigh its
costs. A complete response to this challenge is beyond this paper’s scope,
but three points are relevant. First, interventionist remedies would not be
appropriate all the way down the enforcement pyramid.24 I am talking about
a relatively small subset of firms. Second, and just as crucially, this paper
argues for a standards-based approach in the remedial enforcement context.
The cost of post-enforcement standards-based remedies should compare
favorably to the cost of prophylactic standards-based requirements, such as
the controversial provisions in section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that
require public companies to report on the adequacy of their internal financial
controls.25 Third, any cost/benefit analysis should factor in not only the
noncompliance escalates, enforcers can escalate deterrence, reserving the most severe
sanctions for the small number of very serious cases. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
RESPONSIVE REGULATION 35-41 (1992). The enforcement pyramid’s effectiveness depends
very much on Enforcement’s ability to collect and interpret valid data on firm cooperation.
22
E.g., Securities Exchange Act § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5 (2004).
23
Christopher Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct,
90 YALE L. J. 1, 28 (1980).
24
The whole purpose of the regulatory pyramid is to allocate scarce enforcement resources
toward the worst offenders, and to avoid the chilling effect of over-regulating law-abiding
firms. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 35-41; see also EUGENE BARDACH &
ROBERT KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS
(1982) (arguing that regulatory strategy based mostly on punishment fosters resistance within
regulated firms).
25
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262. Whether or not such
certification requirements are a necessary part of the regulatory scheme, their costs can be
significant. See, e.g., John Thain, Sarbanes-Oxley: Is the Price Too High? WALL. ST. J.,
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immediate cost outlay the Reform Undertaking represents, but also the
substantial long-term costs the status quo imposes on consumer confidence
and firm viability.
Responding to the opposite challenge, this is not a marginal project
even if only a few firms are involved. Worst-acting firms should attract
scrutiny because they are responsible for disproportionate social costs.
Understanding the full range of reasons why certain firm cultures bring forth
repeated law-violating conduct also sheds light on firm culture generally.
Moreover, the problem of the worst actor sheds light on the effectiveness of
the securities law regime as a whole. In evaluating outcomes, regulatory
policymakers may be tempted to focus on “gold star” companies whose
success proves the wisdom of the regulators’ approach. A focus on
enforcement blunts that tendency. It keeps us realistic—not only with
respect to proposals that may be credulous about firms’ bona fides
generally, but also with respect to proposals that underscrutinize firm
functionality in the name of an ostensibly tough (but actually limited)
deterrence approach. Limitations of method in spurring reform among
worst actors can be a telltale for a more general limitation of method.
Relying on Massive Deterrence
One strategy that SEC Enforcement is not likely to pursue under
Chairman Cox is the imposition of massive deterrent monetary fines on
organizations, as well as individuals. Some advocates of strong corporate
accountability mechanisms may see this as a negative development. It is not
necessarily so, for the reasons below.
Under Chairman Donaldson, the SEC’s approach to the recent crisis
was to step up prosecutions, including prosecutions against organizations,
and to impose massive monetary fines on individuals, regulated entities, and
public companies.26 The presumption was that “any serious violation of the
May 27, 2004, at A20; Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of
Corporate Compliance With Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71 (2002); Stone, supra note
23, at 36-45 (distinguishing between the substantial cost of standard-based directives when
applied broadly, as opposed to their most circumscribed cost in the retrospective remedial
situation). On the distinction between rules and standards, see Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
26
In 2003, the Division of Enforcement filed 679 enforcement actions, more than in any
previous year. See William H. Donaldson, Remarks to the Practicing Law Institute (Mar. 5,
2004), http://www.sec.gov/speech/spch030504whd.htm. According to Commissioner Harvey
Goldschmid, statistics show an approximate 40 percent increase in enforcement cases brought
by the Commission between fiscal years 2001 and 2004. See Richard Hill, Goldschmid:
Companies Should Not Let SEC Enforcement Hinder Their Creativity, 36 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 2203 (Dec. 13, 2004). Stephen Cutler has observed that his Enforcement
Division imposed 15 penalties over $50 million between early 2003 and fall 2004, including
many of the highest penalties ever obtained in SEC enforcement actions. Stephen M. Cutler,
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federal securities laws should be penalized with a monetary sanction.”27
The Enforcement Division has filed an unprecedented number of actions,
especially against organizations, in the last two years.28 The quantum of the
penalties is also unprecedented: consider the WorldCom settlement,29 the
global research analyst settlement,30 the Enron-related financial services
firm settlements,31 the market timing and late trading mutual fund company
settlements,32 or those with public companies such as Quest
Speech: The Themes of Sarbanes-Oxley as Reflected in the Commission’s Enforcement
Program (Sept. 20, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch092004smc.htm.
27
Cutler, supra note 2.
28
Cutler, supra note 26. Taking a different tack, the New York Stock Exchange, under new
Executive Vice President and Chief of Enforcement Susan L. Merrill, is engaged in a
comprehensive penalty review “designed to change the behavior of firms that run afoul of
exchange rules on a recurring basis.” Kip Betz, Comprehensive Penalty Review Underway at
NYSE Regulation, Official Says, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 2116 (Dec. 6, 2004). Among
other options, it is considering replacing monetary fines with alternative deterrence strategies
including suspending certain business lines for a period of time; suspending a firm's ability to
underwrite an initial public offering of stock or sign new investment banking clients; or
restricting the opening of new branch office or brokerage accounts. Id. Like this paper, the
NYSE is examining what structural mechanisms, going beyond monetary penalties but
falling short of the “penalty default” of firm shutdown, might be available to spur
institutional change among worst actors. See infra notes 214-16 and accompanying text. In a
similar move, the Federal Reserve recently barred Citigroup from engaging in any major
acquisitions until the company had “fixe[d its] regulatory problems.” Mitchell Pacelle et al.,
Fed Ties the Hands of Citigroup, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 18, 2005, at C1.
29
SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., 273 F.Supp.2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (imposing a $2.25 billion
penalty, satisfied post-bankruptcy at $750 million).
30
Not including disgorgement, civil penalties against the ten firms in their settlements with
the SEC, NASD, NYSE and states amounted to $487.5 million, with the lead taken by
Citigroup at $150 million. Press Release, SEC et al., Ten of Nation's Top Investment Firms
Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Investment
Banking (Apr. 28, 2003), http://sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm.
31
The SEC levied a total of $197.5 million in civil penalties, alongside substantial
disgorgement orders, against Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, and CIBC. See In
re Merrill Lynch & Co., Litigation Release No. 18038 (Mar. 17, 2003),
http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18038.htm; In re Citigroup, Inc., Exchange Act Release
No. 48230 (July 28, 2003), http://sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-48230.htm; SEC Charges J.P.
Morgan Chase In Connection With Enron's Accounting Fraud, Litigation Release No. 18252
(July 28, 2003), http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18252.htm; SEC Charges Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce and Three Executives With Aiding and Abetting Enron's
Accounting Fraud, Litigation Release No. 18517 (Dec. 25, 2003),
http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18517.htm.
32
See e.g., In re Invesco Funds Group, Inc., Investment Company Act Release No. 26629
(Oct. 8, 2004) ($110 million penalty), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-50506.htm; In
re Alliance Capital Management, L.P., Investment Advisors Act Release No. 2205A (Jan. 15,
2004) ($100 million penalty), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2205a.htm; In re
Massachusetts Financial Services Co., Investment Advisors Act Release No. 2213 (Feb. 5,
2004) ($50 million), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2213.htm; In re Pilgrim Baxter
& Associates, Ltd., Investment Advisors Act Release No. 2251 (June 21, 2004) ($50 million),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2251.htm; In re Putnam Investment Management,
LLC, Investment Advisors Act Release No. 2226 (Apr. 8, 2004) ($50 million),
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Communications,33 Royal Dutch Shell,34 and Bristol-Myers.35 The SEC also
supported a still-pending congressional initiative to increase the penalties it
may levy, which the SEC has described as “an important step in achieving
the desired deterrent effect under the securities laws.”36
Former SEC Director of Enforcement Stephen Cutler described the
era’s approach as “an evolution, if not a revolution, in thinking.”37 The
nature of the (r)evolution requires some elaboration. In the speech quoted at
the beginning of this paper, he explained the shift toward levying massive
civil fines against organizations, as well as individuals, in terms that suggest
the view that general deterrence can lead to profound, industry-wide change:
[P]enalties against entities should be used for the same
reason they are used in part against individuals—to deter
misconduct.
....
. . . When the Commission obtains a penalty against an
entity, it provides a powerful incentive for companies in the
same or similar industries to take steps to prevent and
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2226.htm; In re Janus Capital Management LLC,
Investment Advisors Act Release No. 2277 (Aug. 18, 2004) ($50 million),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2277.htm. These numbers do not include restitution
damages. Some of these firms were also made subject to Reform Undertakings; see infra
note 142.
33
Qwest Communications consented to disgorge $1 and pay a civil penalty of $250 million,
the entire amount of which is to be disbursed to investors pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley’s Fair
Fund provisions. See SEC v. Qwest Communications Int’l Inc., Litigation Release No.
18936 (Oct. 21, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18936.htm; see also
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 308, 15 U.S.C. § 7246.
34
The company consented to the entry of a federal court judgment, pursuant to section 21(d)
of the Exchange Act, to disgorge $1 and pay a $120 million civil penalty. In a related
administrative proceeding, Royal Dutch Shell undertook to “to spend $5 million in the
development and implementation of a comprehensive internal compliance program under the
direction and oversight of [its] Legal Director.” In re Royal Dutch Petroleum Company,
Exchange Act Release No. 50233 (Aug. 24, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/3450233.pdf. See also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u.
35
Bristol-Myers consented to pay a $100 million fine and to disgorge $50 million. SEC v.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, Litigation Release No. 18820 (Aug. 4, 2004),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18820.htm.
36
Stephen M. Cutler, Testimony Concerning The Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor
Restitution Act before the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and
Government Sponsored Enterprises, Committee on Financial Services (June 5, 2003),
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/060503tssmc.htm. Commissioner Glassman is one of
the SEC Commissioners to have expressed reservations about the SEC’s trend toward large
civil penalties levied against organizations, rather than individuals. See, e.g., Cynthia A.
Glassman, Remarks at the 13th Annual Public Fund Boards Forum: The Challenges of
Striking a Regulatory Balance (Dec. 6, 2004),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch120604cag.htm.
37
Cutler, supra note 2.
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address comparable misconduct within their own walls.
Thus, a single enforcement action has the potential to effect
change on an enormous scale, causing the development or
enhancement of internal controls, supervisory procedures,
and compliance functions at hundreds of other companies.
Moreover, entities have the ability to influence strongly
the compliance orientation of their own employees. . . .
Imposing a significant penalty may be the best way for the
Commission to cause companies to change their cultures
and to make it in their financial interest to take a proactive
role in preventing individual misconduct.38
The claim that Enforcement can “effect change on an enormous
scale” suggests a larger systemic role than Enforcement historically has
claimed.39 It also suggests a more nuanced awareness of the role of
organizational culture than one associates with the traditional, conductpreoccupied approach to deterrence. On closer reading, however, the Cutler
approach does not stray far from utilitarianism. The reference to “culture”
notwithstanding, the approach is still one that is built on a static
understanding of the firm as proverbial “bad man,” which will only change
its culture to the extent that doing so is in its financial interest.40 The
assumption is that optimally-calibrated punishment increases the cost of
violating the law, and thereby changes the firm’s calculation of the
advantages of doing so.41 Indeed, such a response does not signify a
cultural change at all; only an acknowledgement that rational firms must
learn how to look as though they care about culture, because it is in their
pecuniary interest to adopt that public stance. Reform-through-sanctions
sets up incentives for firms to do nothing more than avoid more sanctions.
Strategies for avoiding regulatory sanctions are not necessarily coterminous
38

Id. (emphasis added). Mr. Cutler’s view on the role of monetary penalties as punishment,
when imposed on organizations, comes out less clearly in this speech. He refers to civil fines
as “fundamentally a punitive measure intended to enhance deterrence of securities laws
violations,” and says that their ratcheting up is “driven by two goals: increased accountability
[for past wrongdoing] and enhanced deterrence.” It is unclear whether Mr. Cutler intended to
distinguish between organizational and individual liability with respect to the punitive aspect.
In any event, he views enterprise liability as operating alongside, not in lieu of, individual
liability and “gatekeeper” oversight.
39
The charge that the SEC is overreaching its statutory jurisdiction and infringing on
traditional state powers in the corporate governance arena is outside the scope of this paper.
See generally, Deborah Solomon, SEC Is Sued Over Fund-Board Rule, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3,
2004, at C17. Also beyond the scope of this paper are worries about the appropriateness of
potential “backdoor” rulemaking through Enforcement action. But see infra note 201 and
accompanying text.
40
See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
41
See Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a
Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232 (1985) (using a recent version of this approach, which
considers the use of nonmonetary sanctions in deterring criminal behavior).
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with strategies for identifying root causes and problems, and working to fix
them.42
I do not disagree that the in terrorem effect of large but not arbitrary
monetary sanctions may directly force important changes in the daily
operations of some rational and self-interested firms. As such, this kind of
deterrent may be a sensible, if partial, response to firm wrongdoing, and one
may hope that it does not fall completely out of favor when dealing with the
most egregious cases.43 Recent sociolegal work has suggested new ways in
which “old school” deterrence mechanisms may reinforce good governance
and promote law-abiding behavior in less linear ways, as well. This is the
case for even the least transformative and most mechanical punitive forms—
monetary sanctions, for example—so long as Enforcement’s investigatory
procedures and processes are generally believed to be fair, its decisions
reasonable and factually supported, and its conduct demonstrably evenhanded.44 Consider that the enforcement of law, like law itself, serves an
expressive purpose.45 Firms seek the legitimacy that legal approval confers,
not only for culturally expressive reasons but also in part because that
legitimacy can confer tangible benefits, including currency with other
industry actors.46 Again, insofar as regulator conduct is perceived to be
credible and proportional, enforcement action can stigmatize businesses visà-vis the public and other companies with whom they wish to do business.47
42

See infra, notes 106-18 and accompanying text.
See infra, Part 5. I leave to one side the empirical studies suggesting that deterrent
mechanisms do not prevent firms, or the individuals operating in them, from violating the
law. See, e.g., SALLY S. SIMPSON, CORPORATE CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 40
(2002); SCHLEGEL, supra note 13. My claim is only that some firms may be directly
motivated by the fear of sanctions, and that sanctions may also have indirect effects as
discussed above.
44
Making the same point in the broader criminal context based on psychological studies is
TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
45
See Cass Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996);
Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 36265 (1997).
46
Scholarship on the interaction of law and norms is extensive. E.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg,
Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253 (1999) (arguing that corporate
actors are motivated less by the desire to avoid liability than by the joint effect of social
norms, and the correlative prospect of financial gain in the market); Mark C. Suchman,
Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571
(1995) (arguing that law shapes organizational conduct not only because of law’s cultural
weight, but also because organizational legitimacy is pragmatically linked to benefits and
penalties); Cass Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
47
See generally Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
591 (1996) (arguing in favor of “shaming” over incarceration with respect to “white collar”
criminals); Avitai Aviram, Regulation by Networks, 2003 BRIGHAM YOUNG U. L. REV. 1179
(2003) (describing “network effects” as a mechanism for private ordering and selfregulation); Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law
Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997) (arguing that that Delaware corporate law, as
43
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Enforcement action can also serve an error correction function, in that it
provides an additional set of standards (redundant in places and/or reflecting
different priorities), which helps to reduce wrongdoing arising from simple
managerial distraction.48
Enforcement can also resolve collective action problems where new,
socially desirable norms are just taking hold.49 For example, an industry’s
standard practice may violate the securities laws but be so entrenched, and
perhaps competitively advantageous, that no individual industry actor is
likely to reject the practice unilaterally. Legal sanctions can influence this
type of industry norm. Especially relevant to industries with such
entrenched practices is the fact that a well-designed and fairly administered
enforcement system can help perpetuate an environment where each actor
believes that other actors are complying with rules—a belief that positively
correlates with voluntary compliance.50 Even the worst performers will not
want to be the “last ones out of the pool” if they have the impression that
norms are changing within their subgroup.
Keeping the “big stick” of massive sanctions in reserve can also
buttress other Enforcement demands, including perhaps the demand that a
firm engage in additional, explicitly forward-looking remedial steps such as
the Reform Undertaking discussed below.51 There is nothing necessarily
inconsistent between forward-looking and retrospective Enforcement
sanctions operating together. Whether particular forms or conceptions of

interpreted by courts, is best understood as attempts to create social norms for senior
managers, directors and the lawyers who advise them).
48
See John T. Scholz & Wayne B. Gray, OSHA Enforcement and Workplace Injuries: A
Behavioral Approach to Risk Assessment, 3 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 283, 303 (1990)
(analyzing results of six year empirical study of 6,842 manufacturing plants).
49
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 46, at 968; Amitai Aviram, A Paradox of Spontaneous
Formation: The Evolution of Private Legal Systems, 22 YALE L. & POL. REV. 1 (2004);
Clayton Gillette, The Lock-In Effect of Norms, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 813, 832-35 (1998).
50
See John T. Scholz, Enforcement Policy and Corporate Misconduct: The Changing
Perspective of Deterrence Theory, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 261-65 (1997)
(according to Scholz, the belief that others are complying with mutually advantageous rules
correlates more closely with individual firm compliance than do other factors, such as the
size of the penalty for violation, which would be more important under a pure deterrence
model. Enforcement action can bolster incentives to cooperate voluntarily. Scholz argues
that the support function of public enforcement is enhanced where criminal sanctions are
limited to egregious cases; enforcement procedures are perceived to be fair; substantive rules
are perceived to be adequate and legitimate; Enforcement targets ‘bad apples’ and gives
greater deference to compliant firms; and where Enforcement strengthens and encourages
private enforcement systems (e.g., trade associations)). See also the “tit-for-tat” literature:
ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra
note 21, at 20-27.
51
See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 39.
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deterrence, as implemented, undermine a deeper corporate governance
project is part of the subject examined here.52
Unfortunately—and this is key—the presence of deterrenceavoiding conduct, as measured externally for regulatory purposes, does not
always turn out to be the same thing as the presence of an actual “culture of
compliance.” While one may believe that the firm itself is in the best
position (in the sense of having access to the greatest amount of
information) to allocate compliance costs in ways that most efficiently
further its own immediate self-interest, one may not feel confident, for
reasons of capacity or trust, about leaving such decisions there. Firms seek
the benefits that regulatory approval confers, but simultaneously they may
subvert coercive structures that force conflict with other cherished goals. If
adherence to externally-defined facial compliance indicators provides the
legitimacy-granting rewards they seek, then organizations seeking
legitimacy may choose to be only facially compliant. This may be so
because of conflicting internal commitments,53 because of internal blindness
to causal factors,54 or because they resist the substantive content of those
compliance rules.55
Without attention to the underlying cultural reasons for the
wrongdoing, one risks sending the message that facial compliance alone can
avoid sanctions and confer legitimacy on firm conduct. In the process, one
reduces the scope for more profound, endogenous cultural change. What a
reform-through-massive-sanctions approach signals, more than anything, is
52

See infra, Part 5.
Some empirical work suggests that managers can satisfy external demands for corporate
governance reform, while avoiding unwanted compensation risk and loss of autonomy to
Board members, by adopting but not implementing asked-for governance structures, and by
bolstering those actions with symbolic language. See James Westphal & Edward Zajac, The
Costs and Benefits of Managerial Incentives and Monitoring in Large U.S. Corporations:
When Is More Not Better?, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT J. 121 (1994); Edward Zajac & James
Westphal, Accounting for the Explanations of CEO Compensation: Substance and
Symbolism, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 283 (1995). Analysis of data from over 400 corporations over
a decade-long period suggests that the stock market reacts positively to symbolic corporate
governance reforms, even when not implemented, and that the symbolic actions diminish the
likelihood of some subsequent governance reforms. James Westphal & Edward Zajac, The
Symbolic Management of Shareholders: Corporate Governance Reforms and Shareholder
Reactions, 43 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 127 (1998).
54
See, e.g., Mark Suchman & Lauren Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: The New
Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 903, 910-11,
914-15 (1996) (arguing that both the “rational” and “normative” camps in sociolegal
literature overvalue conscious reasoning in accounts of why people obey the law);
BAZERMAN & WATKINS, supra note 13, at 95-119 (describing organizational failures in
processing information and reacting to it).
55
See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, Expanding the Scope of Institutional Analysis,
in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 63, 67-68, 79 (Walter Powell
& Paul DiMaggio, eds., 1991).
53
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the regulator’s inability to imagine remedies that can respond directly to the
culture-based problems that the regulator itself has identified. Reformthrough-sanctions offloads to the firm, without benefit of regulator support
or institutional learning, the task of identifying organizational problems and
identifying solutions. The firms this paper is most interested in affecting are
those with the most dysfunctional and/or intransigent cultures—precisely
the same ones that will not, or are not able to, reorient their own cultures in
the hoped-for ways through penalty imposition alone. Deterrence may
effect change in some situations, but it is not guaranteed to do so. All of this
might be acceptable if it were unavoidable, but it is possible to do better,
within existing structures and regulatory resource constraints. In the case of
the worst actors, for whom deterrence has proven to be an insufficient
driver, regulators and the public need not settle for this sort of wishful,
black-box56 approach to problems of culture.
Strikingly, the other trend in recent SEC rhetoric (only accidentally
served by the trend toward massive deterrence) has been a recognition that
institutional culture matters because it generates law-abiding and lawviolating conduct, meaning that sanctions against individuals only are
incomplete as a response to recent corporate and financial sector scandals.57
To be sure, the SEC recognizes that good corporate culture is the sine qua
non of good corporate citizenship. Former SEC Chairman Donaldson’s
ambitions were wider than seeing compliance programs put in place, or even
ensuring a law-abiding tone at the top. He stated that his goal was to
“enhance and improve corporate governance to help restore the moral DNA
of entities throughout the U.S. economy.”58 Lori Richards, Director of the
SEC Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, frequently refers
to the notion of a “culture of compliance.”59 Mr. Cutler spoke at length
56

See CHRISTOPHER STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 121 (1975). In Stone’s language, my
proposal is “interventionist,” to be distinguished from the “black box” approach. See also
Stone, supra note 23, at 28.
57
I am not suggesting that the SEC should focus on corporate culture in lieu of making
individuals accountable for their wrongdoing, especially at the highest levels of public
companies and regulated entities. These are not incompatible approaches. In addition, this
culture-oriented approach is not meant to take the place of other structural explanations for
recent scandals. See e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the
Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW. 1403 (2002); John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron?
A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269 (2004);
Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years
Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 736-37 (2003). My point is that given the
SEC’s new awareness of the importance of firm culture, it needs a coherent response to
problems of that nature.
58
Donaldson, supra note 26.
59
See, e.g., Lori A. Richards, Speech: The Culture of Compliance (Apr. 23, 2003), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042303lar.htm (last visited May 12, 2005)
(articulating the principles of a “culture of compliance”).
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about the elements of a law-abiding culture.60 There is a correlation, too,
between the new focus on organizations, and the new language of cultural
reform. This wide-lens approach is new in securities enforcement, although
it is reminiscent of the kinds of institutional reform-minded remedies
familiar from public law.61 It remains to be seen whether it will persist
under Chairman Cox, but public perception of the systemic nature of recent
scandals certainly suggests a compelling need to continue to speak to those
concerns.
“Soft” concepts like “culture” can be hard to pin down, but it is not
naïve to talk about them. Nor is it wise to behave as if law enforcement can
afford to operate without reference to them. Regulators in a wellfunctioning system do not have to anticipate every form that wrongdoing
can take, or create exhaustive lists of inappropriate conduct, because
sanction alone is not what keeps the system going. Because the
decentralized securities law model puts so much responsibility in the hands
of regulated entities, its regulators drastically hollow out their own system if
they profess helplessness—as they effectively do by focusing only on
massive deterrence in these hardest cases—in the face of deeper issues of
firm culture.
I submit that securities law enforcement mechanisms exist that can
respond to in-firm institutional problems in a more considered way, and one
that is sensitive to questions of deep organizational culture, without
requiring massive resource commitment by Enforcement staff. Moreover,
such mechanisms can further a level of collective, industry-wide learning
about compliance that is not accomplished through massive monetary fines
alone. These new mechanisms are already being used, in a partial way, by
the SEC. I call them the Reform Undertakings. In other words, in practice
if not in principle, Enforcement has recognized that the deterrence model is
not a complete response to problems of firm culture. In this paper, naming
the Reform Undertaking phenomenon is partly an attempt to fold the results
of the SEC’s own on-the-ground learning into its theoretical conception of
itself and its role.

60

See Stephen M. Cutler, Speech: Tone at the Top: Getting it Right (Dec. 3, 2004), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch120304smc.htm (last visited May 12, 2005)
(“Cultivating a culture of compliance requires a sustainable effort. A one-time push is not
enough. … don’t fall victim to a checklist mentality.”); Stephen M. Cutler, Remarks before
the 2004 Investment Company Institute Securities Law Developments Conference (Dec. 6,
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch120604smc.htm (last visited May
12, 2005) (describing the “three Ps” of place, people, and process required to avoid another
round of scandals).
61
See infra note 62.
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Administrative Enforcement and Institutional Reform
Recent work in public law litigation suggests that spurring deep
change within complex organizational systems requires a broader range of
tools than the traditional prosecution of rights-based claims provides. It is
time to introduce this work to the corporate governance field.
Almost three decades ago, Abram Chayes described an emerging
dichotomy between traditional conceptions of adjudication, and an emerging
judicial role in public law litigation.62 In traditional adjudication, the suit
involves only the private parties before the court. It is self-contained and
party-initiated. A dispassionate judge identifies the private right at issue
based on doctrinal analysis and retrospective fact inquiry. She imposes
relief, understood as compensation for the past violation of an identifiable
existing right. By contrast, in public law litigation, the debate is more about
the vindication of broader statutory or constitutional policies. The lawsuit is
not self-contained. The judge must manage complex trial situations
involving not just the parties to the dispute, but also the many and shifting
parties not before the court who may nevertheless be affected by the suit’s
outcome. Fact inquiry is predictive. Through a combination of party
negotiation and continuing judicial involvement, the judge fashions relief
that is ad hoc, ongoing, and prospective. As such, judges can become
change agents under whose management specific cases can have farreaching effects—not just for their deterrent value, but because the relief
fashioned focuses squarely on institutional reform.
The public law adjudicatory model pulls away from traditional
adversarialism in favor of participatory, forward-looking, non-adversarial
methods. Lately, this problem solving approach has become one theme in
an emerging school of thought known as “new governance,” or
“experimentalism.”63 This approach identifies ongoing deliberation as both
62

See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976). For two important theoretical elaborations on the deliberative public law litigation
model, see Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355,
1365–76 (1991) (developing a deliberative model for remedial decisionmaking); and Charles
F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds,
117 HARV. L. REV. 1016 (2004) (using case study narratives to illustrate a theoretical model
of structural reform through public law litigation).
63
I am glossing over noteworthy distinctions in speaking of experimentalism and New
Governance together. Other terms for similar approaches include “reflexive law,”
“responsive regulation,” and “network governance.” New Governance has emerged as a
global term to refer to this set of approaches. Within it, experimentalism (an approach
associated with, among others, Charles Sabel, Michael Dorf, Bradley Karkkainen, James
Liebman, and William H. Simon) may be distinctive for its Deweyan pragmatist arguments in
favor of decentralized decisionmaking in the service of broader social goals, and for the
comprehensiveness of its description of the “rolling best practices rulemaking” needed to
track progress toward those goals. Susan Sturm shares the emphases on pragmatism,
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the most legitimate, and most effective, mechanism for making decisions in
complex organizational structures. The deliberation is accomplished by
decentralized, broadly participatory stakeholder groups that can access local
knowledge and context-specific understandings of a situation.
Decisionmaking within the groups is buttressed by explicit reason-giving,
based on reference to identified norms rather than pure exchange. A
centralized information-gathering body aggregates experience and permits
comparative learning. It is a “learning by doing” structure, meaning that
groups continually revise both ends and their own process through their
participation in it.
Transparency and accountability, including
accountability for adhering to non-negotiable participatory norms, are
reinforced by the centralized comparative data analysis function.64
In spite of worries about courts’ capacity and legitimacy in working
larger institutional reform,65 the new methods show promise. Civil rights
advocates, using public law litigation, have had some significant successes
in “destabilizing” failing institutions and reforming practices in areas such
as public school administration, mental health institutions, prison
management, responses to systemic police abuse, public housing,66 and
health care provision.67 Novel court structures have also emerged as part of
the recognition that complex social problems are not always best resolved in
a (stereotypically) atomistic and adversarial environment.68
Beyond court action, and operating very much across the traditional
public law/private law divide, New Governance theorists are also
reorienting conversation about employment discrimination,69 environmental

demonstrably reasoned decisionmaking practices, and centralized comparative learning, but
see Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 555 (2001). For a conversation about the current state of play, see
generally Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance
in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); and Bradley C. Karkkainen,
“New Governance” in Legal Thought and In the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to
Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471 (2004).
64
See Sturm, supra note 62, at 1427-1444; Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 345-56 (1998).
65
See Sabel & Simon, supra note 62, at 1017-19.
66
See Sabel & Simon, supra note 62, at 1022-53. Unlike Chayes, Sabel & Simon do not
believe the new public law litigation techniques signal a break with the older adjudicative
model. Id. at 1056-62.
67
See Louise G. Trubek, Public Interest Lawyers and New Governance: Advocating for
Healthcare, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 575 (2002).
68
See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and
Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000); Michael C. Dorf & Jeffrey A.
Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts: From Innovation to Institutionalization, 40 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1501 (2003). Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 936-953 (2003).
69
See generally Sturm, supra note 63.
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regulation,70 public school administration,71 international labor standards,72
and regulation generally.73 The most provocative proposals argue for the
application of deliberative, pragmatic “democratic experimentalist” methods
to constitutional law and jurisprudence.74 What makes the model attractive
in securities law enforcement is not only its willingness to address head-on
(albeit through incremental means) the challenge of reforming complex
institutions, but also its somewhat unexpected success across a wide range
of other, apparently intractable, problems.
The Unique Enforcement Environment
I began this section with a reference to courts, rather than regulators,
because the idealized traditional adjudication model shares features—and
related worries—with the common view of the enforcement function as
retrospective and self-contained. Unlike courts or regulators, however, there
has been little academic attention focused on the potential of enforcement
bodies (i.e., the administrative law analog to the criminal law prosecutor) to
force New Governance-style change.75 First impressions may suggest some
conceptual tension between the traditional enforcement role and the New
Governance approach, but I argue that reform-oriented solutions can be
embedded within the enforcement function, in particular in securities law
enforcement. There can be broad overlap between retrospective and

70

See Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (1995); Bradley
C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance
Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2000); Bradley C.
Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Environmental
Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (2002).
71
See James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined:
The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 183 (2003).
72
See ARCHON FUNG ET AL., CAN WE PUT AN END TO SWEATSHOPS? (2001).
73
See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1 (1997); and, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000);
Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437
(2003).
74
See generally Dorf & Sabel, supra note 64; Brandon L. Garrett & James S. Liebman,
Experimentalist Equal Protection, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 261 (2004); Michael C. Dorf,
Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875 (2003); Cristie L.
Ford, In Search of the Qualitative Clear Majority: Democratic Experimentalism and the
Quebec Secession Reference, 39 ALBERTA L. REV. 511 (2001); JEAN L. COHEN, REGULATING
INTIMACY: A NEW LEGAL PARADIGM (2002) (preferring the term “reflexive law” and not
necessarily aligning herself explicitly with democratic experimentalism).
75
But see MALCOLM SPARROW, THE REGULATORY CRAFT: CONTROLLING RISKS, SOLVING
PROBLEMS, AND MANAGING COMPLIANCE (2000) (identifying changes in internal enforcement
approaches, from customer service- and process-oriented to problem solving, in the mid to
late 1990s).
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prospective approaches, to the benefit of both enforcement and corporate
governance reform.76
To be clear, though, two things make this situation different from
the idealized public law litigation context. First, these cases settle. Second,
enforcement staff does the settling, and brings to the process its own
particular culture and orientation. Each of these attributes puts significant
torque on the New Governance model.
Settlements provide obvious resource conservation benefits, but
they impose a cost in terms of lost transparency. Firms settling regulatory
actions can keep aspects of their internal wrongdoing out of the public eye
by resolving matters before full-blown trial. They can be expected to
leverage their greater knowledge of what went wrong, and to try to settle
before all the facts emerge, precisely to avoid a more thorough investigation.
This reduces public, regulatory, and judicial learning about violation
patterns more generally. In fact, firms can resolve matters with prosecutors
before even the (overworked) prosecutors have a complete sense of the
depth of the problem. Because of their informational advantage, firms can
also assess the likely penalty range better than enforcement can. Settlement
can even be a way for firms themselves to avoid facing the pervasiveness of
their corporate governance problems. Sanctions meted out in settlements
may therefore be poorly suited to responding to the most serious problems.
At the aggregate level, as well, the opacity can make enforcement’s forceful
“culture of compliance” message seem less convincing. Individuals,
including those leading organizations, are more likely to abide by rules they
perceive as legitimate and procedurally fair.77 Therefore, enforcement
mechanisms that are not transparent may lack demonstrable credibility,
which in turn may undermine tendencies toward law-abiding behavior. As
discussed below,78 given SEC Enforcement’s settlement framework,
onlookers may be right to be cynical about whether broader corporate
governance priorities are being advanced behind the concealing curtain of
settlement.
The second key difference here is that Enforcement staff, not courts,
are the primary arbiters of these settlements. As change agents, the
enforcement arms of administrative regulators are much understudied.
Enforcement in particular has not garnered much attention from New
Governance theorists. This may be because the enforcement process has
been seen, rightly or wrongly, to have become fossilized into an oldfashioned prosecutorial form based on retrospective and blame-oriented

76

See infra, Part 5.
See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
78
Infra Part 2.
77
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decisionmaking.79 Perhaps, because they have been able to offload systemic
impact questions to the regulatory arms of their agencies, enforcement
divisions have not been pushed toward a more public-regarding stance to the
degree that courts have.
Having enforcement personnel focus on broader systemic reform
has implications. To begin with, relative to regulators, the enforcer’s task is
retrospective and blame-oriented, not prospective and reform-oriented. The
liability model on which enforcement/prosecution is based serves a
legitimate social function in signaling public norms, and those norms affect
the conduct of other actors. While blame is only one kind of possible
deterrence, its shaming effects can provide a coercive “stick,” external to the
regulatory process, to reinforce law-abiding behavior.80 At the same time,
blame-ascribing models tend to be better suited to individuals than to
organizations. Blame-oriented models struggle with how to respond to the
corporate form, although the basic intuition—that blame allocation is an
important part of a regulatory system—has not been dislodged.81
Enforcement action provides a mechanism by which the firm, and
the larger market, can digest and move beyond acute instances of
wrongdoing. It serves a legitimate purpose in achieving closure, which
reduces downward pressure on stock valuation (to the benefit of current
shareholders), allows the firm to emerge intact as a productive business
entity and employer, and prevents an escalation into a larger industry or
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According to Sparrow, this is how proponents of former President Clinton’s customeroriented National Performance Review regulatory model (an early and incomplete, but still
noteworthy, New Governance form) viewed the enforcement function. See SPARROW, supra
note 75, at 49-64.
80
See infra notes 218-222 and accompanying text (comparing shaming/blaming punishments
to the information-forcing coercive mechanism imagined in experimentalist regulation).
81
For interesting recent comments on the normative problems with allocating blame and
criminal liability for corporations, see generally Gilbert Geis & Joseph F.C. DiMento,
Empirical Evidence and the Legal Doctrine of Corporate Criminal Liability, 29 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 341 (2002); SIMPSON, supra note 43; William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence, in
GRAÍNNE DE BURCA & JOANNE SCOTT, EDS., NEW GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
EUROPE AND THE U.S. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 9-11, on file with author). A
bibliography covering both legal and social science resources from the late 19th century
through early 2001 is Joseph F.C. DiMento et al., Corporate Criminal Liability: A
Bibliography, 28 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2000-2001). Causation and individual intent can also
be hard to prove within complex organizational contexts. Contra JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
CORPORATE CRIME IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (1984) (arguing that on the whole,
corporate wrongdoing is pursued for organizational, not individual, ends). For a theory of
organizational jurisprudence arguing that forward-looking regulation is appropriate when
adjudicating controversies involving organizations such as large corporations (and that
retrospective, individualistic arbitration is appropriate when adjudicating controversies
involving individuals), see MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A
LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY (1986).
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market crisis.82 If the goal is to spur institutional reform, however, the
downsides to this closure orientation are twofold. First, within the process,
the closure-oriented model seems incapable of making space for the kinds of
deep and broad, time-intensive and often difficult self-examinations that a
real cultural shift would require.83 On the contrary, the focus on closure is
likely to stimulate end-game strategic responses from firms. The most one
could hope for would be compliance with externally imposed rules, meant to
channel firm action within certain bounds. Second, at the institutional level,
the fact that enforcement actions are time-limited means there may be no
aggregation of institutional knowledge about governance problems.
Enforcers as a group may not get better at predicting problems, identifying
risk factors, or developing workable remedies over time.84
Similarly, the Enforcement-firm relationship is not geared toward
ongoing, trusting collaboration.
Like prosecutors, Enforcement’s
relationship with firms being investigated will, by definition, be adversarial
and suspicious. This is not to say that they want to see firms harmed.
Individual Enforcement staff may be agnostic on the overall goodwill of
market actors, or they may believe that every firm will do anything it can get
away with, or they may believe that most firms act responsibly and their job
is to weed out the “bad apples.” Yet in all cases they are institutionally
charged with remaining suspicious of their actual targets and skeptical about
unsubstantiated promises. If they were not, we would be concerned about
agency capture.
Finally, even if Enforcement culture were less retrospective, blameoriented, closure-oriented, and suspicious, Enforcement does not have the
institutional resources needed to engage in the kind of open-minded,
systemically oriented, ongoing process that most experts in change
management say are necessary to destabilize entrenched routines and
achieve real change. Entire industries are devoted to such tasks. In order to
address this kind of problem, Enforcement staff would first have to figure
out what cultural problems exist. This would require a sufficiently deep
understanding of the complex interplay of reporting lines, personalities,
history, and acculturation that create firm culture. Then, the same non-
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I am not speaking of that exceedingly rare firm that is so “rotten” that the only course must
be to shut it down. See infra notes 213-216 and accompanying text.
83
On the difference in institutional culture between government lawyers and social scientists
such as economists (in terms of lawyers’ preference for circumscribed sets of provable facts
over broader systemic analysis), see JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 61-61 (1989).
84
See also HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING (1990) (arguing, in the police
context, that rather than merely trying to solve crimes after they are committed, the police
should study crime patterns in order to identify underlying conditions that stimulate the
commission of crimes, and then move proactively to eliminate them).
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expert staffers would have to develop context-appropriate responses that
were as pervasive and elastic as the culture they seek to supplant.
Even without trying to effect large-scale cultural changes,
Enforcement resources are stretched to an almost unmanageable degree.
Enforcement settles the vast majority of its actions, not only for all the usual
settlement reasons but also because it could not effectively prosecute them
all. Certainly, it could not prosecute all the cases it is investigating at any
one time, but the point goes further: it takes enormous resources to get to the
bottom of the kinds of large and complex securities cases that are being
brought routinely in recent years.85 According to one report from mid-2002,
SEC Enforcement was so overwhelmed that “evidence rooms on the 8th and
9th floors of the SEC’s downtown Washington headquarters [were] so full
that boxes of subpoenaed documents [were] stacked in hallways,” and Mr.
Cutler himself admitted that his staff was “stretched to the limit.”86 The
SEC Enforcement model—perhaps like the prosecutorial model generally—
was not designed to conduct the kinds of massive document reviews, factual
investigations, and informational analysis needed to understand the myriad
facets of a particular act of firm wrongdoing, let alone to fashion systemic
solutions to cultural problems.
Nor do I think that increasing Enforcement resources to allow
staffers to undertake “deep” scrutiny is the solution. Enforcement staff
should not be transformed into corporate governance consultants. Recent
85
Enforcement subpoenas and requests for documents in the post-Enron era tend to be
broadly worded and to compel vast swaths of data including general business documents,
email and instant messaging records, and financial and account systems information. See,
e.g., Barry B. Burr, First time: Consultants under the gun with SEC probe; ‘Pay-toplay’ allegations spur sweeping, detailed investigation, 32 PENSIONS & INV. 1 (Jan. 12,
2004). For one leading East Coast document management firm, the average regulatory
document production project involves about 100,000 documents. At the upper end, the firm
has processed more than 3 million documents, resulting in about 10 million pages, in a single
case. It has produced 250,000 documents – in excess of one million pages – to a law firm in
a single day. E-mail from Jay McNally, CEO, Ibis Consulting, Inc., to Cristie Ford (June 13,
2005) (on file with author). Of course, after being individually reviewed by lawyers, those
documents are produced to regulators at a distinctly more human pace. Nevertheless,
Enforcement is ill-equipped to handle this kind of volume, provided to them at first instance
(per their request and in keeping with the firm’s work product privilege) as a largely
undifferentiated mass of data. As New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer’s office has
shown, even small teams of enforcers may be able to bring firms to the settlement table. See
Richard Thomson, America’s Celebrity Prosecutors: Chasing the white collar crooks puts
top lawyers on the glory trail, EVENING STANDARD (U.K.), June 13, 2003, at 42 (noting
Spitzer’s investigation of stock analysts involved hundreds of thousands of documents and
emails and was handled by only four lawyers); Michael Schroeder, Stock Analysis: States’
Wall Street Probes Bog Down, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2002, at C5. This does not necessarily
imply that those enforcers have a comprehensive picture of the information produced to them.
86
Michael Schroeder & Greg Ip, Imperfect Guardian: SEC Faces Hurdles Beyond Low
Budget In Stopping Fraud, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2002, at A1.
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increases in the SEC’s budget allocation from Congress,87 and a recent push
to make the SEC more technically adept at handling the information it does
receive,88 only tinker around the edges of a fundamental mismatch between
institutional design and information volume.89 One can scarcely imagine
how an agency facing this kind of information burden could assume
additional responsibility for understanding and working to resolve pervasive
cultural problems among firms being investigated. If the goal is nothing
more than to resolve cases as expeditiously as possible, Enforcement can
make significant progress through individual interviews or depositions and a
sufficient number of key documents. But one can understand why,
aspirational proclamations aside, Enforcement staff might take a deterrencebased approach to trying to further institutional reform. Irrespective of any
faith in that approach, they are not in a position to do much more.
Because Enforcement does not have the resources, the mandate, the
necessary culture, or the appropriate relationship to organizations to effect
meaningful organizational change, they may “satisfice”90 in three ways:
first, as discussed above, they revert to a “black box” deterrence approach to
the securities laws. In other words, they may impose severe monetary fines,
declining to engage in any follow up to determine whether progress is made,
and depriving themselves of an important learning opportunity in the
process. The second and third ways in which they satisfice relate to the
ways in which an organization may bid for leniency during settlement
negotiations. Specifically, SEC Enforcement will settle with firms on
favorable terms, even including taking no sanctioning action at all, in
exchange for either of two things: (a) indicia that the firm has an adequate
compliance regime in place; and (b) firm cooperation with Enforcement
after an investigation has been initiated.
87
See SEC, 2004-2009 Strategic Plan, 22, 27 (Aug. 5, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/secstratplan0409.pdf (last visited May 12, 2005) (showing that
over the last several years, the SEC’s Congressional budget allocation has increased
significantly, growing from $514 million in fiscal 2002 to $811.5 in fiscal 2004); Anna Wilde
Mathews et al., The Bush Budget Proposal: FDA, FCC Get Rare Boosts, While SEC Funding
Is Stable, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2005, at A14 (reporting President Bush has requested $863
million for the SEC in fiscal 2006, up only slightly from the fiscal 2005 figure of $857
million).
88
See SEC, 2004-2009 Stategic Plan, supra note 87, at 32-33, 48-50 (announcing new staff
training initiatives and new or expanded automated information management tools).
89I am speaking primarily of Enforcement, but even in the normal regulatory course, the
SEC is expected to manage an enormous information volume. See Schroeder & Ip, supra
note 86; see also “Financial Oversight of Enron: The SEC and Private-Sector Watchdogs,”
Report of the Staff to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs (Oct. 8, 2002),
available at http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/100702watchdogsreport.pdf (last visited
May 12, 2005).
90
The term refers to resolutions that may be good enough in the circumstances (i.e., wherein
goals are somewhere between “satisfied” and “sacrificed,”), but that are not optimal.
HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN (1957).
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If the presence of compliance programs and cooperation with
Enforcement staff were positively and substantially correlated with good
corporate governance/citizenship, then it would make sense to extend
leniency on these terms. On the other hand, this settlement approach is illadvised if there is no such correlation, or the correlation is weak.
Settlements reached on this basis would not constitute wise husbandry of
scarce enforcement resources, but rather arbitrary grants of leniency without
regard to the potential that that firm may commit or permit more
wrongdoing in the future. It would be even more discouraging if enforcers
suspected (as they might) that there is no clear correlation between the bases
for leniency and good corporate citizenship, but—because impossible
information volumes leave them with an tenuous grasp on their cases, or
because they are resigned to the system’s imperfections—believe they have
no choice but to settle on such face-saving terms. Especially in the
nontransparent settlement context, such a practice could degenerate into a
“trading of favors,” insincere and unverifiable demonstrations of
compliance, and the potential failure of due process for individuals. In the
section that follows, I argue that these are precisely the problems presented
by the SEC’s settlement guidelines, known as the Framework for
Cooperation.
The other alternative, the Reform Undertaking model,91 recognizes
that Enforcement’s purpose is not to get to the root of a systemic corporate
governance problem on its own, even if those are the problems that it needs
to address. Nevertheless, it constitutes the Enforcement action as an
intervention that is far more engaged than the one contemplated by
deterrence alone. The Reform Undertaking model involves an independent
third party consultant to help the organization address its own governance
problems, over a longer period of time, and after the immediate enforcement
action has been provisionally resolved. In this way, Reform Undertakings
uncouple the catalyst-for-reform of the enforcement action from the
specifics of reform measures. This reduces some of the pressure toward
strategic action, and if properly implemented can create an environment
more conducive to fostering meaningful positive culture change.

2. Problems With the Framework for Cooperation
The discussion in Part One, above, describes the limitations of the
Donaldson-era SEC’s deterrence-based strategy in meeting the agency’s
stated intention of spurring institutional reform, and suggests that a New
Governance-style approach may be better suited to the task. It identifies
some challenges, relative to other New Governance initiatives, arising from
91
See Infra Part 3 (explaining the Reform Undertaking model as one that uses enforcement to
further, but not to define or manage, more profound institutional reform).
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the Enforcement-driven and settlement-oriented environment. I return to
those below, and make recommendations for a incorporating a version of
New Governance problem solving into real-life enforcement.92 However,
deterrence is only half the picture. Enforcement has stated that certain “core
factors” influence the decision as to quantum of penalty, or even whether to
impose a penalty at all. The factor that often proves decisive in their
analysis is the extent of a violator’s cooperation, as measured by the
standards set forth in the [Framework for Cooperation].93 The Framework
for Cooperation effectively sets out the indicia that a firm must demonstrate
to obtain leniency from Enforcement. It is an integral part of the
nontransparent settlement dance described above, and its structure and
rationale should be of concern to those aspiring to foster improved corporate
governance standards through SEC Enforcement action.
The SEC Framework for Cooperation
On October 23, 2001, as part of an Exchange Act Section 21(a)
Report, the Commission released a “Framework for Evaluating Cooperation
in Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion.”94 Like the United States Sentencing
Commission’s 1991 Organizational Sentencing Guidelines on which it was
loosely modeled, the Framework for Cooperation settlement approach can
be boiled down to two basic requirements. In order to obtain leniency, the
firm must demonstrate (1) that it has in place compliance mechanisms
designed to prevent and detect violations of law within the firm (“credit-forcompliance”), and (2) that it has cooperated with authorities after apparent
wrongdoing has been uncovered (“credit-for-cooperation”).95 As a practical
92

See Infra Part 5 (concluding that a coherent hybridity between experimentalism and
securities law enforcement structures can, and should, exist).
93
See Cutler, supra note 2 (highlighting that cooperation is the third and often the decisive
one of three core factors). The first two are the type of violation committed (i.e., fraud or
non-fraud, although non-fraud cases can also attract monetary penalties), and the degree of
harm resulting from the violations as measured by harm to investors, effect on market
capitalization, and/or harm to public trust and confidence. I fold these factors into my
definition of the “worst actors,” above.
94
See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement
Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44,969, (Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter the Framework for
Cooperation], at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm (explaining that the
word “prosecution” here refers to SEC Staff attorneys working in the Enforcement Division);
Comm. on Fed. Reg. of Sec., Report of the Task Force on Exchange Act Section 21(a)
Written Statements, 59 BUS. LAW. 531 (2004) (outlining the recent history of the use of the
Section 21(a) Report).
95
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.1 et seq. (2004). The Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines imposed a mandatory sentencing calculus on federal court judges
dealing with corporate and white collar crime. Those guidelines remain, at a minimum,
persuasive in the wake of the Supreme Court’s rulings on the constitutionality of federal
individual sentencing guidelines, in U.S. v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005). See also United
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matter, the Framework for Cooperation provides Enforcement with a
shortcut that allows it to avoid sorting through all the intricacies of the
complex and information-heavy investigations it brings. In the process,
though, it has the potential to undermine efforts toward corporate
governance reform.
According to the Press Release accompanying the Framework, a
firm’s cooperation with SEC Enforcement staff will be measured along four
broad measures.96 They are: (1) Self-policing prior to the discovery of the
misconduct, including establishing effective compliance procedures and an
appropriate tone at the top; (2) Self-reporting of misconduct when it is
discovered, including conducting a thorough review of the nature, extent,
origins and consequences of the misconduct, as well as promptly,
completely, and effectively disclosing the misconduct to the public, to
regulators, and to self-regulators; (3) Remediation, including dismissing or
appropriately disciplining wrongdoers, modifying and improving internal
controls and procedures to prevent recurrence of the misconduct, and
appropriately compensating those adversely affected; and (4) Cooperation
with law enforcement authorities, including providing the Commission staff
with all information relevant to the underlying violations and the company’s
remedial efforts.97
The Framework’s structure and language show the influence of SEC
Enforcement culture and imperatives. It lists 13 criteria for Enforcement
States Sentencing Commission, Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines (Oct. 7, 2003), at http://www.ussc.gov/corp/advgrprpt/advgrprpt.htm;
John R. Steer, Changing Organizational Behavior – The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Experiment Begins to Bear Fruit, 1317 PLI / CORP 113, 115-26 (2002). Federal criminal
prosecutors have also used the Guidelines as an informal roadmap for cases involving
business organizations. See also Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Eric H.
Holder, Jr., to All Component Heads and United States Attorneys, Bringing Criminal
Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999),
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html; Memorandum from Deputy
Attorney General Larry D. Thompson to Heads of Department Components, United States
Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003),
http:// www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm (recognizing that federal criminal
prosecutors have also used the Guidelines as an informal roadmap for cases involving
business organizations). The Framework, the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, and
their other progeny also ask whether the firm has appropriately compensated those adversely
affected by the alleged wrongdoing. This important criterion is not directly relevant to this
analysis of firm culture and pathologies in regulatory settlements, but remediation
requirements could certainly be a component of a True Reform Undertaking structure; see
infra, Part 5.
96
Press Release, SEC, SEC Issues Report of Investigation and Statement Setting Forth
Framework for Evaluating Cooperation in Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion (Oct. 23,
2001), at http://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/prosdiscretion.htm (asserting that credit for
cooperation may range from no enforcement action at all, to bringing reduced charges).
97
See id.
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staffers to consider in determining whether, and how much, to credit selfpolicing, self-reporting, remediation, and cooperation. Relative to the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, which attempt to articulate general
standards against which to measure a firm’s compliance program,98 the
purpose of the Framework for Cooperation is to specify in clear terms how
firms can obtain leniency. For this reason, the Framework’s language is
prescriptive—almost forensic—and focused on the acute wrongdoing
instance rather than on broader corporate governance indicia.
The only way to convey the Framework’s tenor is to quote the
relevant criteria in full. The eight criteria relevant to this discussion99 are
divided along the following lines: three evaluate prior conditions and good
governance mechanisms in the firm; four evaluate the firm’s response to the
wrongdoing; and one specifically addresses the firm’s cooperation with
Staff. The three criteria that evaluate prior conditions and/or good
governance ask:
2. How did the misconduct arise? Is it the result of pressure
placed on employees to achieve specific results, or a tone of
lawlessness set by those in control of the company? What
98
The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines have been compared to the United States
Constitution, in that they contain “simple statements of general principles that permit its [sic]
application to varied and changing circumstances.” Judge Diana E. Murphy, The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A Decade of Promoting Compliance and Ethics,
1291 PLI/CORP 97, 110 (Feb 2002). Thus, the Guidelines’ definition of “an effective
program to prevent and detect violations of law” is intended to evolve based on best practices
and ongoing learning within the firm about its own risk factors and vulnerabilities. The
Guidelines do not define such an “effective program,” except to say that it is a program that
has been “reasonably designed, implemented, and enforced so that it generally will be
effective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct.” While the precise actions necessary
for an “effective program” depend upon a number of factors, the likelihood that certain
offenses may occur because of the nature of a firm’s business is relevant. The “hallmark” of
such a program is that “the organization exercised due diligence in seeking to prevent and
detect criminal conduct by its employees and other agents.” Words such as “effective,”
“reasonable,” and “due diligence” signal a degree of discretion in deciding what constitutes a
good compliance program. The definition of “due diligence” itself is general and contains
many open and subjective words. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2,
cmt. n.3(k) et seq. (2004). Of course, the Guidelines are hardly an improvement over the
Framework to the extent that they require judges and/or prosecutors to evaluate firms’
compliance systems, just as the Framework requires Enforcement staff to do it.
99
The other five criteria speak more to the allocation of scarce Enforcement resources. Four
criteria assess severity of conduct and magnitude of harm, and go to proportionality of
punishment-versus-crime, rather than to leniency per se. Framework for Cooperation, supra
note 94, at criteria 1, 3, 4, and 5. The final criterion asks whether the company is “the same
company in which the misconduct occurred, or [whether it has] changed through a merger or
bankruptcy reorganization.” Id. at criterion 13. While these are all valid considerations, they
are concerned with the cost-benefit analysis of pursuing Enforcement action against certain
firms, rather than with cooperation, compliance, or culture. See supra notes 24-25 and
accompanying text.
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compliance procedures were in place to prevent the
misconduct now uncovered? Why did those procedures fail
to stop or inhibit the wrongful conduct?100
6. How was the misconduct detected and who uncovered it?
12. What assurances are there that the conduct is unlikely to
recur? Did the company adopt and ensure enforcement of
new and more effective internal controls and procedures
designed to prevent a recurrence of the misconduct? Did the
company provide our staff with sufficient information for it
to evaluate the company’s measures to correct the situation
and ensure that the conduct does not recur?101
The four criteria that evaluate the firm’s response in the period after
wrongdoing has been alleged are concerned with compliance, but also with
damage control. They ask:
7. How long after discovery of the misconduct did it take to
implement an effective response?
8. What steps did the company take upon learning of the
misconduct? Did the company immediately stop the
misconduct? Are persons responsible for any misconduct
still with the company? If so, are they still in the same
positions? Did the company promptly, completely and
effectively disclose the existence of the misconduct to the
public, to regulators and to self-regulators? Did the
company cooperate completely with appropriate regulatory
and law enforcement bodies? Did the company identify
what additional related misconduct is likely to have
occurred? Did the company take steps to identify the extent
of damage to investors and other corporate constituencies?
Did the company appropriately recompense those adversely
affected by the conduct?
9. What processes did the company follow to resolve many
of these issues and ferret out necessary information? Were
the Audit Committee and the Board of Directors fully
informed? If so, when?
100

Recent Commission speeches make it clear that after-the-fact cleanup exercises are no
substitute for pre-existing good governance practices. According to Commissioner Cynthia
Glassman, “if you are looking for leniency you had better be able to show that you cared
about preventing corporate misconduct before you discover that it occurred.” Commissioner
Cynthia A. Glassman, Speech: Sarbanes-Oxley and the Idea of ‘Good’ Governance (Sept. 27,
2002) at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch586.htm.
101
See Framework for Cooperation, supra note 94, at criteria 2, 6, and 12.
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10. Did the company commit to learn the truth, fully and
expeditiously? Did it do a thorough review of the nature,
extent, origins and consequences of the conduct and related
behavior? Did management, the Board or committees
consisting solely of outside directors oversee the review?
Did company employees or outside persons perform the
review? If outside persons, had they done other work for the
company? Where the review was conducted by outside
counsel, had management previously engaged such
counsel? Were scope limitations placed on the review? If
so, what were they?102
These four criteria have a lot to do with the firm’s ex post
cooperation, but there is also one explicit cooperation criterion. It asks:
11. Did the company promptly make available to our staff
the results of its review and provide sufficient
documentation reflecting its response to the situation? Did
the company identify possible violative conduct and
evidence with sufficient precision to facilitate prompt
enforcement actions against those who violated the law?
Did the company produce a thorough and probing written
report detailing the findings of its review? Did the company
voluntarily disclose information our staff did not directly
request and otherwise might not have uncovered? Did the
company ask its employees to cooperate with our staff and
make all reasonable efforts to secure such cooperation?103
The cooperation criterion is the most immediately alarming for
those concerned with due process, safeguarding the attorney client privilege,
and an adversarial process permitting zealous defense of clients. The
Framework makes it clear that SEC Enforcement expects value-added firm
participation in its investigation, not just prompt and adequate responses to
Enforcement demands. In other words, along with making documents and
witnesses available, the firm is expected to identify possible violations and
evidence proactively; to produce a thorough and probing written report and
make it available to Enforcement; and to bring information that
Enforcement might not otherwise have uncovered to its attention.104
While the credit-for-cooperation requirements raise the most
pressing concerns, on further reflection the credit-for-compliance
102

See Framework for Cooperation, supra note 94, at criteria 7-10.
See Framework for Cooperation, supra note 94, at criterion 11.
104
In the criminal context, a similar provision has caused anxiety for at least one observer,
who notes that some practitioners think the government is “laz[y]” and “hitch[ing] a free
ride” on defense counsel’s work. Gibeaut, supra note 6, at 49.
103
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requirements do not fare much better. The problem is that neither ex post
cooperation with Enforcement, nor the presence of compliance programs,
are necessarily proxies for good firm culture. The Framework model also
presumes that firm compliance programs (or, more accurately, firms’
representations about them) can readily be evaluated by regulators. This
may not be the case. In fact, the Framework criteria relating to compliance
may even reflect the SEC’s desire to avoid having to evaluate flexible,
context specific standards for compliance programs in the interest of
finality. Moreover, the Framework ignores the degree to which cooperation
with authorities after wrongdoing has been uncovered can turn into horsetrading and scapegoating. As a result, both credit-for-compliance and
credit-for-cooperation create incentive structures that can undermine, rather
than support, a theoretically ideal enforcement pyramid.
“Cynical Happy-Talk”: The Problem with Credit-for-Compliance
Good corporate governance is a hard thing to measure.
Enforcement staff is not equipped to identify or wrestle with the attendant
issues at any depth. Thoroughly understanding a firm’s compliance
structure and culture would require going through vast quantities of
documents and information during an investigation, and then applying
relatively specialized knowledge about compliance—two functions that
Enforcement staff has neither the time nor the expertise to perform.
Moreover, even among experts the notion of an “effective program to
prevent and detect violations of law” is constantly changing, vague at the
margins, and subject to dispute. Enforcement staff faced with the prospect
of plumbing the depths of a compliance program for purposes of extending
leniency may avoid the problem in a few different ways. They may choose
to define “compliance” in a flattened way, or they may avoid defining it
entirely.
The obvious temptation (or obvious, at least, to those familiar with
the history of command-and-control regulation in this country) is to define
the essentialized “effective compliance program” to a high gloss of
certainty, even at the cost of being optimally effective from a long term risk
management or good governance perspective. Enforcement staff could try
to evaluate firm compliance according to a checklist, rather than in a flexible
or empirically based way.105 Checklists are simpler to work with, and
105

The similarity with discredited command-and-control administrative mechanisms, the
stereotypical example of which requires regulated entities to meet detailed and rigid,
learning-resistant process criteria, is striking. It brings to mind the literature on bounded
rationality suggesting that, when confronted with overwhelming complexity, people tend to
rely on cognitive shortcuts such as heuristics and schema as a way of managing the universe
of possibilities. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, DANIEL KAHNEMAN ET AL., EDS., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 3
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provide a degree of clarity for both firm and overworked Enforcement
staffer. However, rigid, anticipatory rules have limited range for compelling
systemic scrutiny or good behavior. For example, contemporary compliance
scholarship considers having an independent board of directors to be a
crucial step in safeguarding shareholders and the public against managerial
self-interest.106 The presence of a code of ethics is also an important
component.107 Yet, in an empirical study of 221 large- and medium-sized
U.S. corporations, James Westphal found that changes in board structure
that increase the board’s independence from management are associated
with higher levels of CEO ingratiation and persuasion behavior toward
board members, and that such influence behaviors offset the effect of
increased structural board independence.108 Corporate codes of ethics have
also been criticized as being ineffective.109 Relying on shallow tests for
(1982); Jeffrey Rachlinski & Cynthia Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government
Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549 (2002) (applying a cognitive model to regulatory design).
As Troy Paredes has noted, people make bad decisions when the volume of information
increases, and they are forced to apply simpler analytical tools. See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded
by the Light: Information Overload and its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81
WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 434-43 (2003) (discussing investors’ “information overload” and
mandatory disclosure system in securities laws).
106
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and related new self regulatory organization rules
emphasize the importance of a strong and independent board of directors, with certain
committees of the board either a majority or completely comprised of independent directors.
The Act creates extensive protections for Audit Committees in particular, including the
requirement that Audit Committee members be independent of the company, and that at least
one member of the Audit Committee be a “financial expert.” See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 § 407, 15 U.S.C. § 7265. The Act gives the Audit Committee sole responsibility for
appointing, compensating and supervising auditors, and requires the Audit Committee to set
up internal procedures for receiving and reacting to complaints concerning accounting,
internal control, or auditing matters, including establishing a mechanism for handling
confidential, anonymous concerns of employees. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 15 U.S.C. §
78j-1. See also Self Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 48745, 68 Fed.
Reg. 64,154, 64,157-59, 64,161-64 (Nov. 4, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48745.htm.
107
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 406(c), 15 U.S.C. § 7265 (defining the code of ethics as
among other things, honest and ethical conduct, including the ethical handling of actual or
apparent conflicts of interest between personal and professional relationships); see also Self
Regulatory Organizations, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,159, 64,164 (Nov. 12, 2003) (explaining the code
of business conduct and ethics).
108
See James D. Westphal, Board Games: How CEOs Adapt to Increases in Structural Board
Independence from Management, 43 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 511, 529-532 (1998) (explaining, for
instance, that increases in structural board independence lead to larger subsequent increases
in CEO compensation by increasing the level of CEO interpersonal influence behavior).
109
See John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor’s
Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 120-21 (2005) (citing the Enron’s Board of Directors
actions in waiving company code of ethics so that Enron’s CFO could participate in the LJMrelated party transactions, conflict of interest notwithstanding); see also Note, The Good, The
Bad, and Their Compliance Codes of Ethics: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley, and the Problems with
Legislating Good Behavior, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2123 (2003) (asserting that a corporate code
of ethics is only as good as the directors and officers responsible for implementing it).
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board independence, then, fails to account for the undoubtedly nuanced
relationship between board independence and good corporate citizenship.110
Part of the problem is that procedural outputs (e.g., internal reports
generated, number of compliance officers on staff, the installation of a 24hour anonymous whistleblower hotline, etc.) are easier to measure than high
level compliance outcomes. In fact, relatively easy-to-measure outputs are
even likely to receive more attention than hard-to-measure outputs.111 One
can understand how observers might be cynical as to whether prototypical
compliance programs do more than provide lip service to governance norms.
Interestingly enough, this is not what the Framework for
Cooperation does. It avoids overspecification (historically, a regulator’s tic)
in favor of no specification (that is, the largely unfettered discretion of the
criminal prosecutor). The Framework asks only what compliance measures
were in place at the firm, and why they failed. But recall the impossible
information volume that Enforcement must handle, the inscrutability (to
Enforcement) of “effective compliance,” and the Framework’s emphasis on
proactive firm cooperation. In real life, the Framework’s credit-forcompliance provision only opens the door for the firm to convince staffers
that its compliance structures were meaningful, and that the reasons for
failure were specific and unlikely to be repeated. The typical medium for
making this kind of pitch is the Wells Submission, a carefully crafted
written brief the firm submits in support of its position as Enforcement’s
initial investigation draws to a close.112 A firm will virtually never say that
deep cultural problems caused its law violations, and that those conditions
persist. Enforcement will rarely have the informational arsenal to counter
that claim in specific terms.
110

This says nothing of more unorthodox approaches to compliance, the merits of which
cannot even be considered under a checklist-style understanding of compliance. For
example, it may be that not all legitimate compliance mechanisms will be based on increasing
scrutiny. Some work suggests that over-monitoring can decrease employees’ independent
motivation to comply with law. See Robert Cialdini, Social Influence and the Triple Tumor
Structure of Organizational Dishonesty, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO
BUSINESS ETHICS 44 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996).
111
WILSON, supra note 83, at 161-62. The problem is most severe in the most dysfunctional
firms, where the absence of easy-to-read signals from inside – e.g., calls to the whistleblower
hotline – may mask a more pervasive problem.
112
Procedures Relating to the Commencement of Enforcement Proceedings and Termination
of Staff Investigations, Securities Act Release No. 5310 (Sept. 22, 1972). See 17 C.F.R. §
202.5(c) (2005) (providing that persons who become involved in preliminary or formal
investigations may, on their own initiative, submit a written statement to the Commission
setting forth their interests and position in regard to the subject matter of the investigation).
See also In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 60290 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12,
2004) (providing a brief history of the Wells submission process); Joshua A. Naftalis, Note,
“Wells Submissions” to the SEC as Offers of Settlement under Federal Rule of Evidence 408
and their Protection from Third-Party Discovery, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1912, 1912-26 (2002)
(describing generally Wells Submissions).
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The absence of meaningful evaluation standards, combined with the
desire to avoid liability, can also create a moral hazard for firms. The notion
that “there simply does not exist an accepted metric used to assess program
design, operation, and outcome” underlies William Laufer’s pessimistic
view of corporate compliance programs as risk-shifting devices.113 In his
view, firms purchase compliance programs modeled on the Organizational
Settlement Guidelines and their progeny, regardless of their efficacy,
because those programs are designed to result in grants of corporate amnesty
or immunity should wrongdoing be uncovered. Institutional inertia means
that most compliance and ethics programs do not result in significant
change.114 Yet, by pointing to a costly and elaborate compliance structure, a
firm can plausibly shield itself from vicarious liability for an employee’s
alleged wrongdoing.
Thus, according to Laufer, many large firms come to think of
compliance and even corporate ethics as matters of risk management – what
Citigroup CEO Charles Price calls “cynical happy-talk.”115 Compliance
serves an insurance function against zealous prosecutorial action, and firms
purchase only the amount of compliance required to shift liability away
from the firm.116 It would not be in their interest to purchase too-effective
compliance structures that uncovered wrongdoing that otherwise would
have lain undiscovered, so firms may be tempted to follow compliance
requirements in a minimal, even cynical, way.117 Because the Framework
does not explicitly require that compliance programs continually improve,
they become a ceiling instead of a floor. Ironically, then, Laufer suggests
113

See William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance,
52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1390 (1999) (arguing that given equivocal evidence of compliance
effectiveness, the rise of the “good corporate citizenship” movement risks undermining the
objectives and spirit of the corporate criminal law); see also Marie McKendall et al., Ethical
Compliance Programs and Corporate Illegality: Testing the Assumptions of the Corporate
Sentencing Guidelines, 37 J. BUS. ETHICS 367, 379 (2002) (alluding to studies which indicate
that ethical compliance programs do not lessen legal violations).
114
See id. at 1407-11 (citing commentators who note that ethics codes are poorly integrated
into firm culture).
115
See Mitchell Pacelle, Citigroup Works on Its Reputation, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2005, at
C3. To be clear, Mr. Price was speaking of the need to avoid cynical happy-talk in designing
compliance programs.
116
See Laufer, supra note 113, at 1382-1402 (explaining that prescriptive steps for due
diligence afford firms protections from criminal investigations, indictments, conviction, and
fines); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls,
93 YALE L. J. 857, 859-62 (1984) (asserting that employee indemnification agreements tend
to limit the degree to which blame-shifting to employees actually results in pecuniary savings
for the firm); cf. Stone, supra note 23, at 47-56 (arguing at 56 that employee indemnification
can be a “ruse a firm can devise to take care of its good soldiers”). The SEC takes the
position that indemnification for securities law violations is void as a matter of public policy;
see Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.512(h)(3) (2005).
117
See Laufer, supra note 113; Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate
Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 833 (1994).
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that the “good corporate citizenship” movement may actually generate
moral hazards that undermine corporate governance objectives.118
Rewards for having a compliance program in place only go to the
existence of that program—not to the existence of a thoughtful presence
behind them that can work to make them effective and self-reflexive.
Strategies for avoiding regulatory sanctions are not necessarily coterminous
with strategies for identifying root causes and problems, and working to fix
them. The problem, then, is not only overdefinition or underdefinition of
the term “compliance.” but rather the institutional situation that forces
Enforcement to extend leniency to firms in exchange for having an effective
compliance program, when Enforcement can have no way of knowing what
an effective compliance program entails or whether it exists at the firm in
question. What is needed instead is a problem solving approach that focuses
on endogenous learning and norm generation.
The Problem with Credit-for-Cooperation
Self-policing and self-regulating are integral components of the
modern administrative regime. The complexity of modern business means
that neither regulators nor Enforcement staff could do their job without
leveraging the firm in its own regulation. Presumably this makes
Enforcement staff feel justified in meting out increasingly severe
punishments to firms that do not cooperate with their investigators.119
118

See Laufer, supra note 113, at 1405-19. Laufer does not see a way out of the moral hazard
and the problem of “cosmetic compliance” until prosecutors/enforcers and firms share a
consistent understanding of what an “effective” compliance system entails, and a workable
metric for evaluating compliance systems. Supra at 1419-20. See also Kimberly D.
Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 80 WASH. U. L.
Q. 487, 491-92, 510-16 (2003) (arguing that placing excessive importance on compliance
structures raises dangers of underenforcement and social waste).
119
Lucent Corporation was fined $25 million recently for failing to cooperate in an
investigation. According to Associate Director of Enforcement Paul Berger, the case “sends
a message about cooperation during an investigation.” Press Release, SEC, Lucent Settles
SEC Enforcement Action Charging the Company with $1.1 Billion Accounting Fraud (May
17, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-67.htm. Other firms that have
been fined for failing to cooperate include Xerox, Dynegy, Banc of America Securities, and
AIG. See Press Release, SEC, Xerox Settles SEC Enforcement Action Charging Company
with Fraud (Apr. 11, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-52.txt
(imposing a then-unpredcedented $10 million penalty reflecting, in part, a sanction for the
company’s lack of full cooperation in the investigation); In re Dynegy, Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 46537 (Sept. 25, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17744.htm (imposing a $3 million penalty due to
the Commission’s dissatisfaction with Dynegy’s lack of full cooperation); In re Banc of
America Securities LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 49386 (Mar. 10, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-49386.htm (imposing a $10 million civil penalty for
BAS’s alleged failure to meet the Commission’s reasonable document requests, and
emphasizing the “overriding importance” of broker-dealer compliance with requests of
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According to Mr. Cutler, “the Commission is placing a greater emphasis
than ever before on assessing and weighing cooperation when making
charging and sanctioning decisions.”120
But there is cooperation, and then there is cooperation.121 In its
benign presentation, the cooperation condition is an expression of
regulators’ desire to avoid corrosive adversarialism. It aspires to a genuine
partnership between the enforcer and the “good” corporate citizen, which
after all should want to cooperate to root out wrongdoing. In this sense,
firm cooperation after wrongdoing is discovered can be an important
indicator of a firm’s bona fides. The cooperation condition seeks to
eliminate the “hide the ball” culture among both defense counsel and
regulators, in favor of mutually beneficial disclosure and problem solving.122

regulatory authorities during investigations); Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges American
International Group and Others in Brightpoint Securities Fraud (Sept. 11, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-111.htm (imposing a $10 million civil penalty relating
to “AIG’s participation in the Brightpoint fraud, as well as misconduct by AIG during the
Commission’s investigation”).
120
Stephen M. Cutler, Remarks Before the District of Columbia Bar Association (Feb. 11,
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch021104smc.htm. Cases in which
corporate cooperation has explicitly led to reduced sanctions include SEC v. Giesecke,
Litigation Release No. 17745 (Sept. 25, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17745.htm (declining to bring any enforcement
action against Homestore, Inc. because of its “swift, extensive and extraordinary cooperation
in the Commission’s investigation”); In re Rite-Aid Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 46099
(June 21, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-46099.htm (considering
the value of Rite Aid’s cooperation in determining the appropriate resolution of this matter);
Alliance Capital Management, supra note 32; In re Gateway, Inc., Securities Act Release No.
8838 (Nov. 13, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8338.htm (stating
that the Commission has considered Gateway’s cooperative undertakings in deciding to
accept Gateway’s offer).
121
With apologies to Lord Denning: Crabb v. Arun District Council [1976] Ch. 179, 187
(U.K.) (“there are estoppel and estoppel”).
122
Cooperation between investigator and subject was not the norm, at least in the criminal
context, before the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines were implemented. As one
observer noted in 1985, because white collar criminal investigations often went on for
substantial periods of time, “information control” – i.e., “keeping documents away from and
preventing clients and witnesses from talking to government investigators, prosecutors, and
judges” – was central to at least some counsels’ defense strategy. See KENNETH MANN,
DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK, 6-8 (1985). In
case one is left with the impression that only defendants were perceived to be “hiding the
ball,” see, e.g., U.S. v. Liquid Sugars, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 466, 471 n.4 (E.D.Cal. 1994); United
States v. Houlihan, 937 F. Supp. 65, 69 (D. Mass. 1996) (stating that criminal discovery is
not, nor should it be, the game of hide the ball, as the stakes are too high for both sides). The
dates of these cases demonstrate, of course, that “hide the ball” behavior did not end with the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines’ promulgation in 1991.
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Credit-for-cooperation schemes of any sort can be problematic,123
but my concern is primarily the “flipping” kind of cooperation. Seen
through a darker lens, the cooperation condition can imply a quiet
agreement between a firm and its regulator, in which the firm acquires
leniency in exchange for assisting Enforcement staff to make a case against
another Enforcement target.124 Especially given the obstacles they face in
making retrospective sense of the document universe, and the theoretical
and practical problems involved in attaching blame to a complex corporate
form,125 enforcers might be expected to welcome cooperation where it
furthers the enforcement action in question. This is,especially true if the
action includes sanctions against a high-profile individual. Ever-increasing
standards of cooperation can become a substitute for good corporate
citizenship.
The information that emerges from such a process may be suspect,
like all information coming from a self-interested informant.126 Cooperation
is an effective enforcement tool because it cuts through volumes of
information through which Enforcement staff themselves do not have the
resources to wade. The problem is that cooperation cuts through volumes of
documents in unverifiable ways. Moreover, the “cut” is generally
performed by a party that has a stake in the investigation’s outcome, and
that normally has greater financial, human, and information-management
resources than any other party. Recall the value-added cooperation the SEC
demands under the Framework for Cooperation. Because “cooperation”
means not only producing documents and making witnesses available but
also assisting the SEC’s understanding of the case, the firm has the ability to

123

Even in its benign form, the cooperation requirement can cause problems for defense
counsel. Cooperating with the SEC does not guarantee leniency with other regulators or
prosecutors. Privilege waivers in exchange for credit-for-cooperation are rightly
controversial; see, e.g., Am. Coll. Of Trial Lawyers, The Erosion of the Attorney-Client
Privilege and Work Product Doctrine in Federal Criminal Investigations, 41 DUQ. L. REV.
307 (2003) (asserting that by waiving attorney-client privileges, the government demands
change the very nature of the adversarial process of the criminal justice system). Cooperation
can also be detrimental to a firm where information and even counsel work product produced
to a regulator becomes discoverable in parallel civil litigation proceedings.
124
See William S. Laufer, Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation, and the Trading of Favors,
87 IOWA L. REV. 643 (2002); Phyllis Diamond, Special Report: SEC Demand for
‘Cooperation’ Seen Raising Due Process Concerns, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1070
(June 14, 2004).
125
See supra note 81.
126
Criminal prosecutors have known this for a long time. See, e.g., Graham Hughes,
Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1992); Ellen
Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and
Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917 (1999) (arguing that there are no studies that
examine the manner in which cooperators work with prosecutors and the extent to which
prosecutors can determine whether cooperators are truthful).
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shape and frame the evidence, potentially even before the SEC has
developed its own impressions of it.127
In this distorted environment, the parties’ incentives may be aligned,
and this compounds the problem. Where both Enforcement and the firm
have a common interest in seeing problems resolved quickly, and both
understand that allocating blame is a central part of the exercise, expeditious
and mutually satisfactory resolution may become a higher priority than deep
corporate governance reform or due process for individuals. The firm has
an incentive to emphasize those facts that suggest that a rogue employee—
not senior management and not a general culture of disregard for law—is
the cause of its woes.128 The incentive toward what William Laufer calls
“reverse whistleblowing” would theoretically be strongest in those
companies with the most to hide.129 Presumably, an entrenched “insiders’
culture” is also more likely to scapegoat where necessary to protect itself.
Frontline Enforcement staff, for their part, are under a great deal of pressure
(from the public, the media, other regulators, and likely superiors) to
achieve results and exhibit toughness toward corporate wrongdoing.130 High
profile enforcement actions can significantly enhance Enforcement prestige.
The goal of an enforcement action must always include allocating
responsibility (i.e., blame), and resolving the case. Behavioral psychology
tells us that the risk of bias will exist even where both Enforcement staff and
defense counsel are acting with integrity and goodwill.131 Whether or not
individual Enforcement staff and counsel are fair and capable—as no doubt
they are—as a structural matter, no enforcement system should rest so
heavily on embedded individuals’ perfection of judgment.
Moreover, to the extent that Enforcement conduct is not transparent,
credible, and characterized by due process, it undermines efforts to promote
good governance within regulated companies. SEC Administrative Releases
shed little light on the nuts and bolts of how firm cooperation contributed to
127

In addition to producing reports and bringing potential violations to Enforcement’s
attention, other forms of cooperation might include developing chronologies or producing
selective bundles of “hot” documents.
128
A disagreement between employee and firm along these lines is recorded in Randall Smith
& Susan Pulliam, IPO ‘Rogue’ Battles to Clear His Name, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2002, at
C1.
129
See Laufer, supra note 124, at 648-650, 659-660.
130
The powerful effect of prestige-related incentives on prosecutors to bring and resolve cases
is one of the points made by James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM.
L. REV. 2030, 2078-2101 (2000). According to Liebman, the pressure on law enforcement
and prosecutors to “solve the crime and punish the perpetrator, harshly,” combined with the
fact that capital murder cases can often be hard to solve because of the absence of certain
kinds of key evidence, can lead to cutting corners in investigations.
131
See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U.
CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998) (on the “hindsight bias”); Zivi Kunda, The Case for Motivated
Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480 (1990) (on “motivated inference”).
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any particular enforcement outcome. Settlement releases are pre-negotiated
between firm and Enforcement, and generally provide only boilerplate
language to the effect that the Staff had considered the firm’s cooperation in
its settlement decision.132 Worse yet, Enforcement staff themselves may not
be in a position to verify that the firm’s cooperation provided anything more
than potentially shotgun information implicating individuals.
The cooperation condition skews the enforcement pyramid in the
service of conduct that bears only an oblique relationship to compliance
with law. Even the perception that firms can reduce their liability and avoid
meaningful reform efforts by making “backroom” deals is costly. An
employee’s sense that she could be “scapegoated” can result in selfprotective and often counterproductive behavior. When a firm blows the
whistle on one or more individuals, it also obscures the ways in which
corporate wrongdoing is so often an organizational problem.133 Perhaps
more importantly, by offering an easier route to leniency, the cooperation
option can help firms avoid necessary but difficult, resource-intensive,
ongoing self-analysis (carried out in the shadow of a demonstrated
compliance failure). Searching self-reflection is a challenging project that
requires discipline and stamina. Firms might be entitled not to undertake
such a project – in fact their shareholders might expect them not to – where
an officially endorsed shortcut is available.

3. Reform Undertakings as Enforcement Innovation
Whether or not by conscious design, recent SEC actions are
showing the first indications of a new, or newly rediscovered,134 approach to
132

See, e.g., In re Corrpro Companies, Inc., Litigation Release No. 18547 (Jan. 16, 2004),
(where injunction issued, but “the Commission considered that Corrpro undertook remedial
actions and substantial cooperation with Commission staff”), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18547.htm; In re Performance Food Group
Company, Exchange Act Release No. 49243 (Feb. 13, 2004) (“the Commission considered
remedial acts promptly undertaken by PFG and cooperation afforded the Commission staff”),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-49243.htm; In re Citigroup, Inc.,
Exchange Act Release No. 48230 (July 28, 2003) (it was “considered that Citigroup had
cooperated with the Commission's investigation in a timely and comprehensive manner,
including production of witnesses and documents without delay, responsiveness to other
requests for information, and timely efforts to resolve this matter.”), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-48230.htm.
133
See Laufer, supra note 124, at 653, 657. There is some evidence to indicate that the most
harmful white collar crimes are those which are most “organizationally complex.” See, e.g.,
DAVID WEISBRUD, STANTON WHEELER ET AL., CRIMES OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES: WHITECOLLAR OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 183-85 (1991).
134
The SEC has employed “creative” relief, including requiring firms to make an undertaking
to retain an independent consultant or committee to conduct some kind of review, at least
since the 1970s. Comm. on Fed. Reg. of Sec., Report of the Task Force on SEC Settlements,
47 BUS. LAW. 1083, 1128-31 (1992); JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL
STREET, 463-64, 541, 616-19 (3rd ed. 2003); STONE, supra note 56, at 185-86. According to
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enforcement settlements. This approach responds to worries about facial
compliance, scapegoating, institutional capacity, and the limitations of
deterrence in effecting thoroughgoing reform to corporate governance. This
is the “Reform Undertaking” previously referred to in this paper.
Reform Undertakings may be court-ordered,135 administratively
ordered,136 or incorporated into settlement agreements between Enforcement
Mr. Cutler, they were used especially pre-1984, when the SEC’s statutory power to impose
substantial civil penalties was more limited. Cutler, supra note 2. Other precedents for
interventionist enforcement remedies, outside the public law litigation context, include New
York City’s response to organized crime in the late 1980s. See RONALD GOLDSTOCK ET AL.,
CORRUPTION AND RACKETEERING IN THE NEW YORK CITY CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY: FINAL
REPORT TO GOVERNOR MARIO M. CUOMO FROM THE NEW YORK STATE ORGANIZED CRIME
TASK FORCE , 157-74 (1990).
135
In the WorldCom case, for example, the SEC filed suit in June 2002, following the
company’s announcement that its earnings had been massively misstated. SEC Charges
WorldCom with $3.8 Billion Fraud, Litigation Release No. 17588 (June 27, 2002), available
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17588.htm. Following a court-ordered expert’s
recommendations, the Commission sought and was granted injunctive relief under Exchange
Act sections 21(d) and 27, requiring WorldCom to undertake extensive reviews of its
corporate governance and internal controls, as well as establish a training and education
program for its officers and employees to minimize the possibility of future violations of the
federal securities laws. The Commission took the innovative step of requesting of sitting
Judge Jed S. Rakoff that a “Corporate Monitor” (in my terms, a Third Party) be appointed by
the Court, initially only to oversee management’s conduct and ensure that no inappropriate
conduct occurred. As part of a subsequent settlement, the SEC sought, in addition to a
monetary penalty, to have the Corporate Monitor, former SEC head Richard C. Breeden,
conduct a governance overhaul as part of an agreed-upon Permanent Injunction. SEC v.
WorldCom, Inc., Litigation Release No. 17866 (Nov. 26, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17866.htm. According to Mr. Breeden’s Report,
the Permanent Injunction provides that “[t]he Corporate Monitor … shall perform a review of
the adequacy and effectiveness of WorldCom’s corporate governance systems, policies,
plans, and practices. This review will include but is not limited to inquiries into (1) whether
WorldCom is complying with recognized standards of “best practices” with respect to
corporate governance; (2) whether WorldCom has sufficient policies and safeguards in place
(a) to ensure that WorldCom’s Board of Directors and all committees of WorldCom’s Board
of Directors … have appropriate powers, structure, composition, and resources, and (b) to
prevent self-dealing by management; (3) whether WorldCom has an adequate and appropriate
code of ethics and business conduct, and related compliance mechanisms; and (4) whether
WorldCom has appropriate safeguards in place to prevent further violation of the federal
securities laws.” Breeden, supra note 20, at 9 n.4.
136
See, e.g., Ernst & Young, supra note 15. Chief Administrative Law Judge Murray
concluded, inter alia, that Ernst & Young’s stated reliance on a “culture of consulting” to
avoid violating auditor independence rules was a “sham,” and that its business relationships
with PeopleSoft LLP were “outrageous,” “improper,” and “blatant” in their violation of those
rules. She noted that the Commission had tried on two previous occasions to bring Ernst &
Young into compliance through litigation, and held that absent an explicit directive to cease
and desist, the firm would likely commit future violations. Along with other penalties, Judge
Murray ordered:
Ernst & Young LLP shall retain an independent consultant acceptable to the
Commission, to work with Ernst & Young LLP to assure the Commission that Ernst
& Young LLP's leadership is committed to, and has implemented policies and
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and a firm. When part of a settlement agreement, the Reform Undertaking
tends to be accompanied by a cease-and-desist order137 and by additional
relief against either the firm or individuals including disgorgement or
restitution, director and officer bars, the requirement that the firm develop or
enhance existing compliance processes, and civil penalties. The Reform
Undertaking appears as a settlement term to the general effect that the firm
shall retain, at its own expense, an independent third party consultant (the
“Third Party”). The Third Party’s role is to intervene in the firm, identify
compliance failures and reasons for the alleged law violation, and report
back to the SEC. While there is substantial variation in Undertakings’
specific terms, and especially in the language describing the scope and depth
of the Third Party’s investigation, the Undertakings share certain core
features. They include: (1) a focus on the firm, not individuals, with
particular view to its compliance and corporate governance policies,
practices, and procedures; (2) prospective, standards-based language, giving
the Third Parties substantial discretion to interpret what constitutes a
“reasonable” or “appropriate” remedial recommendation; (3) a
presumptively final settlement with Enforcement, combined with provision
for a relatively extended time period during which the Third Party conducts
its review, sometimes further reinforced by subsequent periodic review; (4)
provision for a written Third Party report; and (5) provisions to safeguard
the Third Party’s independence.
In every case I am aware of in which a Reform Undertaking has
been put into action, it has fallen short of being a textbook New Governance
remedy in both drafting and execution. Part Four, below, sets out a model
procedures that reasonably can be expected to remedy the violations found in this
Initial Decision and result in compliance with the Commission's rules on auditor
independence related to business relationships with clients and with GAAS. Ernst &
Young LLP shall cooperate with the independent consultant in all respects, including
staff support, and shall compensate the independent consultant, and staff, if one is
necessary, at reasonable and customary rates. Once retained, Ernst & Young LLP
shall not terminate the relationship with the independent consultant without
Commission approval. The independent consultant shall report to the Commission in
writing six months from the date work has begun as to the findings of its review and
Ernst & Young LLP's efforts at correcting the violations.
137
The Commission has the statutory authority to supplement a cease-and-desist order with a
requirement that its subject:
comply, or to take steps to effect compliance, with such provision, rule, or regulation,
upon such terms and conditions and within such time as the Commission may specify
in such order. Any such order may, as the Commission deems appropriate, require
future compliance or steps to effect future compliance, either permanently or for such
period of time as the Commission may specify, with such provision, rule, or
regulation with respect to any security, any issuer, or any other person.
Securities Act of 1933 § 8A, 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(2000); Securities Exchange Act § 21C, 15
U.S.C. § 78u-3 (2000); Investment Company Act of 1940 § 9(f), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(f) (2000);
Investment Advisors Act of 1940 § 203(k), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(k) (2000).
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of a more complete “True Reform Undertaking,” as a remedial alternative
that incorporates New Governance learning into the distinct Enforcement
environment. However, even in its present form the Reform Undertaking
represents a profound shift in enforcement philosophy. The first step, I
suspect, must have been Enforcement staff’s willingness to address their
own institutional limitations in an innovative way. Unlike the credit-forcompliance and credit-for-cooperation models, the Reform Undertaking
model accepts that Enforcement itself is ill-suited to promote institutional
reform, because it has neither the resources nor the appropriate culture. At
the same time, in its best form the Reform Undertaking model provides a
mechanism for identifying concrete steps the firm must take to reform its
corporate governance as a condition of getting “out from under”
Enforcement scrutiny. In other words, the Reform Undertaking parses the
liability and remedial phases in dealing with a regulated firm. In its ideal
form it uses the enforcement “stick” to spur, but not to define or manage,
more profound institutional reform. It employs the concept of best
practices, which is a Trojan horse for more thoroughgoing reform. Having
committed to that standard, the firm is charged with ratcheting up its
governance practices above mere industry standards, to match the best
practices available on an ongoing basis. This process, in turns, ratchets up
general corporate governance standards.138
During his tenure as Northeast Region Associate Director, Barry
Rashkover observed that the SEC now frequently defers to independent
consultants to tailor specific reforms in the context of court-ordered
undertakings.139 Reform Undertakings also appear in settlement documents,
sometimes jointly reached with other government bodies, such as the United
States Attorney’s Office.140 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the scope of an
Undertaking reached through settlement (rather than adjudication) seems to
be more broadly worded, and undertakings are becoming more detailed and
sophisticated over time. Undertakings appear in settlements with private
138

As one set of commentators has stated, “[t]he relationship between law and organizations
is a highly reciprocal one: Each [sic] realm interpenetrates, transforms, and reconstitutes the
other, with neither being fully exogenous nor causally prior.” Mark Suchman & Lauren
Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: The New Institutionalism and the Law and Society
Tradition, 21 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 903, 905 (1996).
139
See Rashkover, supra note 3, at 544.
140
These footnotes are not a comprehensive catalog of recent Reform Undertakings. But see,
e.g., SEC v. Computer Associates International, Inc., Litigation Release No. 18891 (Sept. 22,
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18891.htm. Computer
Associates agreed, inter alia, to be subject to “[f]orward looking remedial relief, including,
for at least 18 months, that Computer Associates will be subject to the review of an
Independent Examiner, reporting to the SEC, the Justice Department and Computer
Associates’ Board of Directors.” While New York Attorney General Spitzer has been a large
player in recent securities law enforcement actions, to my knowledge his office has not
played a role in fashioning the Reform Undertakings I describe here.
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companies,141 investment advisors,142 specialist firms,143 and self-regulatory
organizations144 (whose own governance practices have been under scrutiny
lately).145

141

See, e.g., In re GE InVision, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 51199 (Feb. 14, 2005),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-51199.htm; In re Monsanto Company,
Exchange Act Release No. 50978 (Jan. 6, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-50978.htm; Bristol-Myers Squibb, supra note 35.
The InVision and Monsanto releases relate to alleged violations of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m et seq. (2004). The only information available online with
respect to the scope of the Bristol-Myers Reform Undertaking is that the Third Party is “to
review Bristol-Myers’ accounting practices and internal control systems and periodically
assess the status of remedial actions undertaken or planned by the Company in those and
other areas, such as financial reporting.”
142
See, e.g., Nevis Capital Management, Investment Advisors Act Release No. 2214 (Feb 9,
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2214.htm; In re H.D. Vest
Investment Securities Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8383 (Feb 12, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8383.htm; In re Massachusetts Financial Services,
supra note 32; In re Alliance Capital Management, supra note 32; In re Putnam Investment
Management, LLC, Investment Advisors Act Release No. 2192 (Nov. 13, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2192.htm. Banc of America Capital Management
voluntarily undertook to retain an independent compliance consultant in a recent settlement:
In re Banc of America Capital Management LLC, Securities Act Release No. 8538 (Feb. 9,
2005) available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8538.htm. As part of each of
these settlements, the SEC obtained (in addition to a cease-and-desist order, monetary fines
and, in some cases, other consideration) firm undertakings to appoint a Third Party, at the
firm’s expense, to conduct an in-depth review of the firm’s policies, practices, and procedures
related to the firm’s area of alleged wrongdoing, for purposes of determining compliance
with the federal securities laws and recommending policies and practices designed to ensure
such compliance. The firms undertook to require the Third Parties to produce a report to the
firm and the Commission, describing the review performed and providing recommendations;
and to implement substantially all the Third Parties’ recommendations or reach an alternative
good faith agreement. Additional terms seek to ensure the firm’s cooperation and the Third
Party’s independence, including a stipulation that the firm shall not have the ability to fire the
Third Party; a prohibition on an attorney-client relationship between firm and Third Party;
and a prohibition on “repeat business” between Third Party and firm. The Massachusetts
Financial Services, Putnam, and Alliance capital settlements also provide for periodic
compliance review after the Undertaking period, although not subject to Commission
oversight. The Banc of America settlement requires the family of companies’ CEOs to
certify that the firms have adopted and complied in all material respects with their
undertakings.
143
Pursuant to its powers under Exchange Act sections 15(b)(4) and 21C, the SEC entered
into similar arrangements with five large specialist firms in regard to allegations of “trading
ahead” of customer orders. All five cease-and-desist orders were issued on March 30, 2004:
In re Bear Wagner Specialists LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 49498, available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-49498.htm; In re Fleet Specialists, Inc., Exchange
Act Release No. 49499, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-49499.htm; In
re LaBranche & Co. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 49500, available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-49500.htm; In re Spear, Leeds & Kellogg LLC,
Exchange Act Release No. 49501, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/3449501.htm; In re Van der Moolen Specialists USA, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 49502,
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The Reform Undertaking should be distinguished from centralized,
one-off structural reorganization, such as characterized the 2003 Global
Research Analyst Settlement.146 However, as structural remedies and
especially in terms of the loss of control the firm experiences, they are
similar to what one might see in bankruptcy reorganization.147 We should
expect them to be unpopular with firms, not only for their indeterminacy and
cost but because to some degree, the Reform Undertaking moves the loss of
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-49502.pdf. The specialist settlements are
similar to the Investment Company Act settlements above.
144
The SEC is empowered to impose sanctions and cease-and-desist orders on self-regulatory
organizations (SROs) under Exchange Act sections 19(h) and 21C respectively.
Significantly, in the first regulatory action following her appointment as Director of SEC
Enforcement, Linda Chatman Thomsen announced an especially comprehensive Reform
Undertaking scheme in connection with a settlement agreement with the National Stock
Exchange and its President and CEO: In re National Stock Exchange, Exchange Act Release
No. 51714 (May 19, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-51714.pdf. The
independent Third Party monitor in that case is responsible for conducting a “comprehensive
review” of the NSX’s policies and procedures relating to, inter alia, rulemaking, surveillance,
member firm compliance examination, virtually the full range of enforcement functions, and
document retention. The Chicago Stock Exchange also recently agreed to a cease-and-desist
order in settlement of an administrative action relating to its failure to supervise and correct
trading rules violations by specialists and co-specialists on its trading floor. See In re
Chicago Stock Exchange, Exchange Act Release No. 48566 (Sept. 30, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-48566.htm. Its Undertaking terms are substantially
similar to those contained in the Investment Company Act and specialist firm settlements
above, but additionally stipulate that either the Board of Governors or the Regulatory
Oversight Committee must certify that it has read the Third Party’s report, made “reasonable
inquiry about the issues raised,” and observed the Exchange’s Undertakings. Further, the
CEO must certify that “he or she reasonably believes that CHX's trading floor surveillance
and enforcement programs are adequate to meet CHX's obligations under Section 19(g) of the
Exchange Act.”
145
Self-Regulatory Organizations – Various Amendments; Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg.
71,126 (Dec. 8, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. Parts 240, 242, and 249), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-50699.pdf; Regulation NMS; Proposed Rule, 69 Fed.
Reg. 77424 (Dec. 27, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. Parts 200, 201, 230, 240, 242, 249,
and 270), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-50870fr.pdf.
146
While the Global Research Analyst Settlements call for the settling firms to retain
independent monitors at their own expense, those monitors’ responsibilities are limited to
“conduct[ing] a review to provide reasonable assurance that the firm is complying with the
[agreed to] structural reforms.” SEC Fact Sheet on Global Research Analyst Settlements, at
http://sec.gov/news/speech/factsheet.htm. See also, In re KPMG LLP, Exchange Act Release
No. 51574 (Apr. 19, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-51574.pdf (in which
KPMG undertook to retain a consultant for the “limited purpose” of certifying to the SEC
that a series of agreed-upon corporate governance undertakings “continue to be in effect, are
being complied with and appear to be effective in achieving their overall goals” after two
years’ time.)
147
See Bankruptcy Code § 1106(a)(3), (4), 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(3), (4). For an intriguing
analysis of the role of the Chief Restructuring Officer, see Douglas G. Baird & Robert K.
Rasmussen, When Good Managers Go Bad: Controlling the Agents of Enterprise
(unpublished manuscript presented at Columbia Law School on March 7, 2005, on file with
Columbia Law School Center for Law and Economic Studies).
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control further up in a dismal chronology of events.148 On the other hand,
behavioral psychology has taught us that people tend to overly discount the
future in their calculations.149 Thus, when one recalls that a large number of
the firms publicly accused of massive frauds over the last few years have
ended up in bankruptcy proceedings, the Reform Undertaking looks like a
sensible intervention before the costs to all involved get even higher.
Comparative Advantages
Relative to the mechanisms discussed above, the Reform
Undertaking does a better job of leveraging Enforcement’s strengths and
compensating for its limitations.
To begin with, the Reform Undertaking handles the resource
problem facing Enforcement. It is the thoughtful result of squarely facing
the misfit between Enforcement’s processes and its aspirations of spurring
institutional reform. As discussed above, Enforcement will never be as well
equipped to analyze detailed information on compliance structures as the
settling firm itself would be. The Reform Undertaking does not require
Enforcement staff to act as long term regulators or compliance specialists. It
allows Enforcement teams to remain temporary, flexible, and nonbureaucratic. It matches tools to problems, rather than trying to shoehorn
problems into existing tools.150
Secondly, as a function of distinguishing the liability phase from the
remedial phase,151 the Reform Undertaking substantially neutralizes the
counterproductive elements of the adversarial stance. There will be little
trust between Enforcement and firms that are being investigated. Firms
often behave in a strategic end-game manner in that environment. It is a
high stakes situation that promotes evasive, not collaborative, action. The
Reform Undertaking relieves some of the immediate pressure by taking the
full articulation of a remedy out of the hands of Enforcement staff, and
putting it in the hands of an independent Third Party. Removing the
Enforcement stick from direct view can create a space where the firm is free,
at least in relative terms, to think about compliance creatively and
autonomously, based on voluntary problem solving instead of rule-based

148

In Ernst & Young, supra note 15, the defendant firm argued that the requirement that it
retain an independent third party consultant was an “outrageous” and punitive measure.
149
BAZERMAN & WATKINS, supra note 13, at 84-87.
150
This is not to say that there will not still be work for Enforcement to do in, e.g., choosing
along which criteria firms should be subject to Reform Undertakings. See SPARROW, supra
note 75, at 155-70. Nevertheless, these are not the same issues that arise from being
confronted with impossible information volumes in an Enforcement division entirely
structurally unsuited to handling it.
151
Sabel & Simon, supra note 62, at 1051-57.

Page 46 of 72

enforcement.152 Because it comes from the firm itself (in conjunction with
Third Party action) and is not imposed from above, this method has a better
chance of producing a sustainable and meaningful response. Relatedly, the
Reform Undertaking reduces the pathologies associated with the short term
orientation. A resolution that is substantially satisfactory to the market is
achieved when settlement occurs, relieving pressure on Enforcement to
resolve the matter through whatever means necessary, but the parties have a
longer remedial timeframe within which to work out the details based on
better information and contextual analysis.153
The Reform Undertaking avoids the over- and underdefinition
problems that credit-for-compliance regimes may suffer from, while still
achieving an adequate level of closure. The Reform Undertaking structure
permits Enforcement staff to jettison rigid compliance checklists in favor of
broad outcome measures. At the same time, they are not left (as they are
now) to exercise their discretion in extending credit-for-compliance, based
on an inevitably incomplete analysis of what an “adequate” program would
entail. Enforcers’ worries about the manageability or enforceability of
vague rules are deflated, since standards-based approaches in the remedial
enforcement context do not face the problems of overbreadth they do in the
predictive context. What remains are general standards, the specific
implementation of which is worked out through the remedial process. One
can track the shift in the language of the Reform Undertaking terms, which
reintroduce open, discretion-granting words. There is talk of “policies and
procedures that reasonably can be expected to remedy violations,” or the
need to consider “broader” or “structural issues” as well as immediate
ones.154 The Reform Undertaking’s investigatory nature addresses the
firm’s incentive to treat compliance checklist as insurance, or to avoid
implementing too-effective mechanisms that might uncover wrongdoing.
Properly implemented, the Reform Undertaking settlement also has
a more explicit and transparent (and therefore reinforcing) relationship to
the enforcement pyramid than do credit-for-cooperation or credit-forcompliance settlements. Firms with deep compliance problems are directed
to respond to those problems, rather than extricating themselves from the
Enforcement ambit through inscrutable means. Especially the True Reform
152

Making the same point in a different context, see Sturm, supra note 63; Susan P. Sturm,
New Governance and the Architecture of Learning, Mobilization, and Accountability:
Lessons from Gender Equity Regimes, in NEW GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra
note 81 (manuscript at 7-8, on file with author).
153
Reform Undertaking terms generally require third parties to produce a first report within
60 days of being retained, but their involvement with the firm tends to be longer: e.g., in
Monsanto, supra note 141, the Third Party is retained for three years.
154
See Ernst & Young, supra note 15; and Chicago Stock Exchange, supra note 144
(discussing the existence of policies and procedures that can reasonably remedy violations).
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Undertaking described in greater detail below does not raise the sorts of
obvious due process concerns that credit-for-cooperation raises. It avoids
both agency capture and backroom horse-trading, as Ayres and Braithwaite
suggest the injection of a third party is likely to do.155 This is important at
the broader level as well. If other firms understand that they cannot “buy”
their way out of Enforcement action through cooperation, and that
Enforcement actions are credible, proportional, and factually justified, this
shortcut to resolution-without-reform will be closed off. By removing from
Enforcement’s hands the ability to reward companies, it neutralizes the fact
that the firm’s and Enforcement’s short term interests in closure and even
scapegoating may be aligned. Transparency produces accountability, and
transparent Enforcement processes are more likely to create market
structures more demonstrably worthy of investors’ confidence.
The Reform Undertaking also maintains the power of the coercive
“stick,” and stays focused on the worst actors. The coercive background
situation remains. Firms that, according to their Third Parties, do not
succeed in the Reform Undertaking environment remain answerable to the
SEC.156 Intuition supports regulatory responses that target the worst
offenders.157 The entire enforcement pyramid presupposes that the worst
offenders are singled out for sanctioning, and that the example of worst
155

On “regulatory tripartism,” see AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 56-58.
Under the language of all the settlements above, firms are required to accept the Third
Parties’ recommendations if they cannot reach a good faith agreement about an alternative
solution. Faced with an unsatisfactory result, the SEC could choose to extend the term of the
Reform Undertaking or to impose additional sanctions, up to and including license
revocation.
157
An important predecessor—successful on its merits, though short-lived for separate legal
reasons—was OSHA’s “Cooperative Compliance Program,” (CCP) created in 1997 and
directed specifically at workplaces with the highest injury rates. The program was modeled
on the award-winning “Maine 200” program, begun in 1993, which targeted the 200
companies in that state with the highest workers’ compensation rates (i.e., Maine’s worst
actors). Companies opting into the program would establish a health and safety program in
cooperation with OSHA, and in exchange would be dropped from OSHA’s regular inspection
program. High-injury workplaces not opting into the program would be the subject of
heightened inspections. In Maine, 65% of participating employers saw reductions in overall
injury and illness rates, and over the first two years participating employers experienced a
47.3% decrease in compensable claims for worker’s compensation (as compared to 27% for
all Maine employers). U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Mini Case Study: “Maine Top
200” —OSHA Shifts its Focus From Regulations To Outcomes (2000), at
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/leveraging/03c.html. The CPP’s underlying directive was vacated
by the District of Columbia Circuit on the basis that OSHA’s issuance of its directive failed
to comply with the notice-and-comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Department of Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 213 (C.A.D.C. 1999).
Since then, OSHA has reverted to rewarding good firms rather than educating/reforming the
worst performers: information on its Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) is available at
http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/vpp/index.html. As a case-specific remedial enforcement
mechanism, the Reform Undertaking is not vulnerable to the same charge.
156
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firms reinforces the system’s credibility down the line. The marginal effect
of change is also greater when dealing with the worst actors, which cause
disproportionate damage. A focus on the worst actors provides a necessary
counterweight to regulators’ tendency to focus on the best performers,
which may be celebrated because they reinforce the wisdom of the agency’s
policies.
Further, the Reform Undertaking model is better suited to problems
of organizational behavior than a model oriented toward individual liability
would be. It accepts that there can be systemic institutional problems at a
firm (something that individual blame models cannot accommodate) but its
focus is not on the senseless exercise of “punishing” the “bad” firm. The
focus is on reform and preventing similar occurrences in the future. This is
a situation where forward-looking remedial standards, relying on technical,
contextual forms of thought rather than blame allocation, are better suited to
the corporate form, and to the goal pursued.158
Finally, the Reform Undertaking is, if anything, even more of a
“wake up call” to firms than normal enforcement is. SEC Enforcement
action is, of course, always destabilizing. It is even more destabilizing when
the prescribed remedy is to engage in an open-ended process, the goal of
which it is to reject the status quo ante in favor of as-yet-unspecified results,
reached through hard-to-control processes, in the presence of an
independent third party.159
158
Simon, supra note 81 at 25-28; Sabel & Simon, supra note 62, at 1054. Contra, see
Dallas, supra note 13, at 6-8 (arguing in favor of individual Director and Officer liability for
failure to address the existence of a “corporate climate that encourages and supports unethical
and illegal behavior” in a firm).
159
Sabel & Simon, supra note 62, at 1020. See also Bradley C. Karkkainen, InformationForcing Environmental Regulation: Penalty Defaults, Destabilization Rights, and
Environmental Governance, in NEW GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 81
(manuscript at 6-7, 29-32, on file with author). According to Sabel & Simon, writing in the
public interest litigation context, the principal effects of destabilization rights are: (1) the Veil
Effect: parties “cannot count on their prior positions, and it may be hard for them to
anticipate what their positions will be like in the alternative future regimes under
consideration”, so the “struggle for selfish advantage is impeded at the outset of remedial
negotiations”; (2) the Status Quo Effect: “[t]he condemnation of the status quo has a distinct
cognitive effect: it releases the mental grip of conventional structures on the capacity to
consider alternatives”; (3) the Deliberation Effect: “justifying one’s position by giving
reasons and responding to reasoned arguments for competing views can alter a person’s
understanding of her factual circumstances and her interests, disclosing previously unseen
opportunities”; (4) the Publicity Effect: contingent on transparency, public scrutiny may
generate pressure toward responsible behavior; (5) the Stakeholder Effects: the balance of
power between plaintiff and defendant shifts, and subordinate players get more autonomy;
internal pressures are generated within the plaintiff class and the defendant institution; new
stakeholders are motivated or empowered to participate; and, (6) the Web Effect. Action
ramifies to other institutions and practices, and creates a new best practices standard that
other institutions will have to consider. Sabel & Simon, supra note 62, at 1073-82.
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4. Next Steps and Missing Pieces
The attributes described above may make one dare to hope that the
Reform Undertaking will be more effective at spurring institutional reform
than any other tool in the Enforcement staffer’s kit. Yet this is not to say
that a poorly designed Undertaking cannot be gamed or manipulated, or that
more traditional sanctions are now anachronistic. On the contrary, one of
the important points this paper tries to make is that New Governance
mechanisms may operate most effectively in tandem with other forms of
compliance-oriented action. No single remedial approach will be an allpurpose magic bullet. Yet, New Governance concepts can make a morethan-theoretical contribution to the complex and messy world of real-life
enforcement action, and settlements.
If it is to be as effective as it can be within its bandwidth, however,
the Reform Undertaking structure will need to gain more traction with
respect to four main issues: the firm’s participation in the process; the role
and accountability of the independent Third Party; the SEC’s ability to
aggregate data on best practices; and Enforcement’s ability to synchronize
staff incentives with mechanisms that further meaningful governance
reform. The sections that follow describe the attributes of a True Reform
Undertaking model that incorporates these important elements, and that
establishes the connection between New Governance theory and real-life
enforcement.160
The Intervention: Attributes of the Process
Unlike the rest of the enforcement process, the Reform Undertaking
is forward-looking. One of the main purposes of separating the enforcement
and remedial phases is to create a relatively brief temporal space within
which the firm can begin to make sense of its history, define objectives, and
identify solutions to cultural problems on an ongoing, iterative basis.161 The
160

For now this project is limited to investigations of large firms. The calculation will be
different when dealing with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), where ownership
may be less dispersed, and both financial resources (to retain a Third Party) and pre-existing
institutional capacity (in the form of a well-staffed compliance department) may be more
limited. Document volumes in the investigation will be more limited as well. Small firms
are too varied in their operations and market niches to generalize about the problem. The
SEC is working through similar problems with respect to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s
requirements. Press Release, SEC, SEC Establishes Advisory Committee to Examine Impact
of Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Smaller Public Companies (Dec. 16, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-174.htm. For a thoughtful discussion of New
Governance environmental regulation and SMEs, see NEIL GUNNINGHAM & DARREN
SINCLAIR, LEADERS & LAGGARDS: NEXT-GENERATION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 13-40
(2002).
161
Susan Sturm’s work on addressing subtle cultural problems in complex social
environments, such as workplaces, develops fine-grained insights into the specific challenges
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point should be to leverage the organization’s own internal vocabulary and
norms to reorient the firm’s perspectives on governance. No one said this
would be easy in practice. On the contrary, there is no lack of empirical
evidence suggesting that the reasons that organizations so often behave in
myopic, rigid ways are deep-seated and not amenable to easy change.162
The magnitude of the challenge notwithstanding, the Reform
Undertaking process can take advantage of the substantial learning that has
occurred in the last few decades, in both private and public sectors, on
problem solving and participatory corporate governance strategies.163 Some
elements of the True Reform Undertaking will be unremarkable to those
familiar with basic governance principles. Most would agree, for example,
that the process should be transparent, thorough, and credible. The Third
Party should produce a written report for the Commission, based on
demonstrably reasoned decisionmaking.164 This means that decisions are
supported by a clear factual record that is the product of a credible
investigatory process; that discussions and decisions about proposed
solutions are justified with explicit reasoning, making reference to available
information and identified governance priorities; and that the investigatory
process as a whole canvasses the range of perspectives and concerns that are
likely to affect the practicality and wisdom of a particular solution.165
Transparent reasoning helps preclude decisionmaking based on pure
exchange, bias, or scapegoating. Decisionmaking is disciplined by its
openness to outsiders’ scrutiny.166

of such projects and substantially informs the discussion that follows. See, e.g., Sturm, supra
note 62; Sturm, supra note 63; Sturm, supra note 152.
162
See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA.
L. REV. 101 (1997), Sturm, supra note 63, at 468-79.
163
See, e.g., John E. Tropman, MAKING MEETINGS WORK, 2D ED. (2003). The Harvard Law
School Project on Negotiation maintains a resource clearinghouse on its website at
http://www.pon.harvard.edu/main/home/index.php3.
164
All the Reform Undertakings identified supra, in Part 3, require the Third Party to produce
a written report, and require that it be provided to the Commission.
165
See Sturm, supra note 62, at 1399-1403, 1411, 1434-36. There is more than one sort of
reasoned decisionmaking. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 81, at 19-22 (describing “root cause
analysis”).
166
Which outsiders should have access to the report is a difficult question. Limiting
participation does limit debate and collective learning, and the results of the Undertaking
would be of quite general interest. Nevertheless, I say that only the SEC and other Third
Parties (either directly or through the SEC) should have access to the full reports, because of
the extraordinary cost and chilling effect of making the specifics discoverable in shareholder
or other litigation. Similar concerns have been raised with regard to the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines. See United States Sentencing Commission, Report, supra note 95, at
116-25. Existing Reform Undertakings make no provision for public dissemination of Third
Party reports.
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Just as importantly, the process should be explicitly participatory.
One might contrast a True Reform Undertaking with the WorldCom model,
in which a central expert—albeit a very capable one—acted essentially
alone to produce a series of guidelines to be implemented by the firm.167
Mr. Breeden’s report is a sophisticated and thoughtful blueprint for revising
corporate governance structures at WorldCom and beyond, but it was
written with that high level purpose in mind—not with a view to creating a
reflexive process within the firm. If the purpose is to spur thoroughgoing
institutional reform, then a Third Party’s top-down solutions will not be a
substitute for the firm’s own involvement. Imposed solutions are less likely
to embed themselves, and a failure to come to terms with the organization’s
collective history can create pathologies around information sharing and
problem solving. As Mr. Cutler has said, law-abiding behavior is a product
not only of structural governance mechanisms, but of all “three Ps”: people,
process, and place (meaning external variables and causative factors).168
Broad participation serves several purposes in this context. Its
advantages over nonparticipatory processes are considerable. First, it
increases the pool of information and contextual knowledge, thereby
improving the discovery process. By contrast, the WorldCom model
reflects a closed system, where a snapshot of information enters after which
a one-time report from an outsider ensues.169 Second, participation creates
buy-in. It gives key players a basis for investing in the process and
committing to its results. Third, participatory exercises are exercises in
governance. They serve an educative function and actively demonstrate
new ways of doing business, ideally while learning to speak realistically
about those areas where firm culture or collective action played a role in
permitting past wrongdoing.170 By contrast, the expert-centric WorldCom
167

Corporate Monitor Breeden’s final report makes 78 specific recommendations, many of
which are geared toward increasing transparency and shifting the balance of power toward
shareholders. See Breeden, supra note 20. The experimentalist approach to the same
problem would have involved extensive empirical analysis, extensive consultation with
WorldCom stakeholders (including service providers and contractors, shareholders,
employees, and other with a stake in the company’s ongoing success), and the creation of a
prospective process for fashioning flexible, effective, self-reflexive governance regimes that
answered to unknown future problems as well as clear past ones.
168
Cutler, Speech, Dec. 6, 2004, supra note 60. See also Diane Vaughan, Rational Choice,
Situated Action, and the Social Control of Organizations, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 23 (using a
case study to illustrate that “a fully elaborated explanation of decisionmaking necessarily
would merge structure, culture, and agency.”)
169
Cognitive psychological insights into experts’ tendencies toward overconfidence and
“expert myopia” are also relevant here. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 105, at 558-61.
See also Sturm, supra note 62, at 1419-21 (on limitations of “expert remedial formulation
model”).
170
In a similar vein, see Sturm, supra note 62, at 1390-96. Sturm also argues that at the
remedial stage, the conceptual restrictions imposed by legal doctrine during the liability
phase are more limited. Thus, what keeps the process rational and legitimate is a different
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model leaves little room for the firm to do its own learning during the
Undertaking time frame, and the guidelines are not revisable through
ongoing learning thereafter. Finally, in view of the “insiders’ culture” that
underlies many securities law violations, broad top-to-bottom participation
makes the process credible to enforcers, and to lower and mid-level firm
employees.
The Third Party’s operational methodology should focus on
problem solving, not just compliance. Relative to compliance, problem
solving requires that a broader and more diverse set of actors be involved,
across a longer timeline, using a different set of information-gathering and
decisionmaking mechanisms.171 Success is measured not by adherence to a
rigid checklist, but by whether the firm’s institutional capacity to identify,
prevent, and redress wrongdoing is improved, and sustainably so. This is
not to say that facially compliant or otherwise unsatisfactory
accommodations will never be reached. However, they stand a better
chance of being identified, scrutinized by reference to important governance
values, and addressed through the True Reform Undertaking process.
Correlatively, the process should be flexible. It should be capable
of learning from its (carefully documented) successes and failures, and
adjusting accordingly. The Third Party should be willing to be creative
about the means used to address firm pathologies, avoiding a priori
preferences for particular approaches. The Third Party should take an
incrementalist approach, breaking the problem into manageable pieces and
tackling each one based on its specific attributes.172
The firm’s general governance standards, then, are realized and
reinforced by the firm’s own careful, unique experience with the True
Reform Undertaking process itself.173 This is no small point. Through this
discipline imposed by participation. Participation also realigns party interests, making
possible agreements along unexpected lines. See Sturm, The Promise of Participation, 78
IOWA L. REV. 981, 1006 (1992).
171
See Sturm, The Promise of Participation, supra note 170. The Reform Undertaking
process should require ongoing periodic review after the Undertaking period itself is
complete. Only a few existing Reform Undertakings do so. See, e.g., In re Banc of America,
In re Putnam, supra note 142; In re Massachusetts Financial Services; see also In re Alliance
Capital Management, supra note 32. They do not require that either the Third Party or the
Commission play any role in the review.
172
Sparrow argues that specificity, incrementalism, and flexible methods characterize many
innovative civil and criminal enforcement techniques. SPARROW, supra note 75, at 81-97.
Similarly, Sturm argues that effective workplace problem solving regimes share four main
characteristics: they are (1) problem-oriented, (2) functionally integrated, and (3) datadriven, and (4) accountable. See Sturm, supra note 63, at 519-20.
173
Sturm, supra note 63, at 475 (“General rules, unless linked to local structures for their
elaboration in context, provide inadequate direction to shape behavior”). The nexus between
broad compliance standards and specific governance and accountability mechanisms,
combined with the presence of a centralized clearinghouse to evaluate individual firms’
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sort of participatory work, the True Reform Undertaking grows connections
between the firm’s own operations and problem solving practices, and broad
and vague governance and compliance standards, in a way that has nothing
to do with facial adherence to externally-imposed, rigid rules.174 Overlydefined rules are never more than a proxy for more general standards; but
overly-vague standards are only made real through their situational learning
and careful testing in practice. Unlike traditional settlement arrangements,
the True Reform Undertaking can make situational learning an integral part
of Enforcement action.
Profile of the Third Party
Third Parties will have substantial discretion. What do we know,
then, about their ability to effect change? How do we know they will not be
captured, as agencies are sometimes captured by the entities they regulate?
How will the Third Party manage resistance from inside the firm, and what
resources will it rely on in the event of non-cooperation? What rewards will
the Third Party seek in return for taking on this potentially thankless task?
The Reform Undertaking substantially transfers the ability to reward and
forgive from Enforcement to a Third Party. What, then, of the possibility
that the firm’s and the Third Party’s mutual interests in closure and
proclaimed success will also be aligned, and that gaming conduct, present in
relations with Enforcement, will simply be transferred to the post-settlement
timeframe?175 Given that the Enforcement context deals with worst actors,
we cannot simply assume that firms will engage genuinely in the
Undertaking process, without credible oversight and without the certainty
that other possible shortcuts have been blocked.
My purpose here is only to sketch out the broad outlines of the
Third Party’s profile, to demonstrate the idea’s applicability to securities law
success, provide the missing components to Krawiec’s description of “network governance.”
See Krawiec, supra note 118 (arguing that open standards-based regulations create
incomplete contracts within which parties can engage in strategic gap-filling).
174
This also responds to Scholz’ worries about vague prophylactic compliance standards in
the Enforcement context. Scholz suggests that firms are tempted to cheat on vague
directives, and prosecutors have the power to insist on Herculean efforts at reform after
wrongdoing has occurred (even if a firm took reasonable and effective self-regulatory steps
before the fact.) This produces a prisoner’s dilemma, where both firms and the SEC would
be better off with vague rules, but both sides could gain an even more favorable outcome by
cheating on the other. John T. Scholz, Enforcement Policy and Corporate Misconduct: The
Changing Perspective of Deterrence Theory, 60-SUM LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 259
(1997). Making remedially-developed standards, instead of prophylactic ones, the driver
dissipates some of this tension.
175
The worry brings to mind recent suggestions that so-called “independent” research
analysts, whose industry was given an enormous boost by the terms of the 2003 Global
Research Analyst Settlement, may also have conflicts of interest. Ann Davis and Susanne
Craig, Analyze This: Research is Fuzzier than Ever, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2004, at C1.
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enforcement.176 The problem is not a simple one, and the next step must be
to identify the attributes that prove to be most important in actual securities
law enforcement practice. But to be effective, the Third Party will surely
need four key attributes: credibility, independence, the right skill set, and
accountability.
The Third Party will need credibility with the SEC, but more
importantly it will need credibility with the firm. It should be able to speak
the firm’s language, including the language of value-for-money that will be
relevant to the firm’s perception of the Reform Undertaking process itself.
The Third Party should be aware of, and be prepared to dispel, the
perception that the True Reform Undertaking is a cynical process or a rentseeking opportunity for compliance professionals.177 The Third Party
should probably be someone with previous experience in the industry writ
large, and with sufficient gravitas to signal that the Undertaking has the
attention of management and the SEC.178 This is one reason that it may
make sense to appoint top-flight law firms or high profile individuals as
Third Parties. However, the most important element of credibility is likely
the Third Party’s ability to continually generate trust. Doing so requires
transparency and good faith in dealing with the firm, in what will no doubt
be trying circumstances. Because we are dealing with worst-performing
actors, it is appropriate to ensure that the Third Party has some considerable
heft. Nevertheless, the Third Party can only facilitate, challenge, and
oversee a process that must have the firm’s own agency at its core. Creating
a communicative environment within which parties are willing to
participate, and where they can imagine the possibility of a new way of
doing business, is a crucial part of the role.
Second, the Third Party will have to be independent from the firm.
This comprises both structural and psychological elements. Structural
independence means that the Third Party should not be operating with a
view to obtaining future business by currying the firm’s favor.179 The Third
176

For a compatible and more comprehensive description of the roles of various problem
solvers in addressing systemic problems, see Sturm, supra note 63, at 522-37.
177
See, e.g., Erica Beecher Monas, Corporate Governance in the Wake of Enron: An
Examination of the Audit Committee Solution to Corporate Fraud, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 357,
368 (2003); Krawiec, supra note 118, 511-12, 528-32; Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K.
Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 375 (1997) (describing compliance personnel and lawyers as rent seekers).
178
See Sturm, supra note 152, at 35-40 (describing the role of mediating actors in gender
equity regimes).
179
Most Reform Undertaking provisions restrict the Third Party’s ability to do business with
the firm for a period of time after the Undertaking period is concluded. See, e.g., GE
InVision, supra note 141; Monsanto, supra note 141; the Investment Advisor Act
Undertakings, supra note 142 (requiring the Third Party to agree that for the duration of its
retainer and for two years thereafter, neither it nor, subject to the Commission’s consent, any
firm with which it is affiliated shall “enter into any employment, consultant, attorney-client,
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Party should also be able to rely on outside support, from the Commission,
in the event of non-compliance. The firm itself must recognize that it
cannot exit. It must know that facial compliance, “freezing out” the Third
Party, or other dysfunctional behavior has a good chance of being spotted
and will result in the direct reapplication of the SEC’s enforcement
“stick”.180 At the psychological level, the Third Party must have the courage
to publicly repudiate the process, or report to the Commission, if she
concludes that it is failing irredeemably.181 Here, Judge Rakoff’s approach
in the WorldCom settlement was to engage an individual whose own
considerable reputational capital served as a buttress against the firm
pressures.182

auditing or other professional relationship with InVision, its successor-in-interest . . . or any .
. . present or former affiliates, directors, officers, employees, or agents acting in their
capacity”). Existing Reform Undertakings also stipulate that the firm shall not have the
ability to terminate the Third Party, and must cooperate with her investigation.
180
An outstanding question is whether the firm has a right to contest the Third Party’s
findings. One independent third party monitor with experience in anti-corruption initiatives
in New York City believes that the risk is too great that an appeal mechanism relating either
to the Third Party’s recommendations, or to any centralized best practices standards, would
be hijacked by a firm that was disinclined to engage in the process in a meaningful way.
Telephone interview with Carl Bornstein, attorney and independent third party consultant
(Dec. 27, 2004). Existing Reform Undertakings, supra notes 136 and 140-55, make no
provision for appeal by the firm: although the firm can take issue with the Third Party’s
recommendations, those recommendations must be followed if an alternative good faith
agreement cannot be reached between firm and Third Party.
181
The Monsanto Reform Undertaking, supra note 141, requires the Third Party to
affirmatively report violations of law to the company’s compliance officer, who “shall then
be obligated to promptly report the same” to SEC staff. Recently, Independent Monitor
Edwin H. Stier publicly resigned his leadership of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters’ internal anticorruption program. The program was established in 1999 as part of
continuing federal oversight of the union following the 1989 settlement of a federal
racketeering lawsuit. Mr. Stier resigned on the basis that union President James P. Hoffa, Jr.
had “backed away from the Teamsters’ anticorruption plan in the face of pressure from selfinterested individuals.” Steven Greenhouse, Citing Pullback, Antigraft Team Quits
Teamsters, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2004, at A1. There is considerable tension between the
Third Party’s “snitching” function and its ability to win the firm’s trust. See Note, Mastering
Intervention in Prisons, 88 YALE L. J. 1062, 1063 (1979) (arguing that conflicts between the
multiple roles of Special Masters appointed in the prison reform context hampers their
effectiveness). I do not believe this problem is insurmountable in this context. These parties
are likely to have had more experience than prison administrators and inmates normally
would with contingent or nuanced professional relationships. As sophisticated parties, they
would likely respond positively to a clear statement of “ground rules” at the beginning of the
engagement. Also, relative to the prison situation, this situation is less focused on working
through powerful intergroup and interpersonal tensions (although some will certainly exist)
than by working through a process that will save the firm from shutdown. Equally important
is the background presence of the enforcement “stick” here, which operates on actors’ direct
interests and forces them to the table in a particularly urgent way.
182
See Breeden, supra note 20.
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Third, the Third Party will have to have a considerable range of
skills, and a level of acceptability to all parties without being beholden to
any. (The Third Party can and perhaps should be a team, not one
individual.) The Third Party will have to have the ability to connect and
facilitate dialogue across the firm hierarchy, and to manage large volumes of
viva voce and paper or electronic information. She and her team will need a
strong knowledge base in compliance and corporate governance principles,
including issues of organizational structure and experience with culture.
The ideal Third Party may or may not be a lawyer.183 At the same time, she
will have to be justice-regarding and able to take into account the power
imbalances between, for example, management and the individuals that
“followed orders” during the era of the law violations. The Third Party
must be alive to the possibility that the firm’s directing minds may be
tempted to scapegoat individuals. A “justice audit” should be part of the
process. The Third Party, like the firm, is a potential abuser of individual
due process rights.184 Faced with the hurdles of trying to create change, the
parties, Third Party included, could be tempted to satisfice for superficial
compliance or less thorough reforms. The Third Party may also be tempted
by over-rigid resolutions in situations where any progress, however
superficial, seems better than deadlock.
For all these reasons, the Third Party must be accountable to the
SEC. Her ultimate report should speak not only to recommendations for
firm change, but also to the Third Party’s own methodology and
independence. The Third Party cannot be the final arbiter of the success of
her own recommendations.185 There must be a mechanism to ensure that the
183

In other areas of reform-minded remedies, the most innovative New Governance has
seemed to take place when lawyers are not at the table. Linda Treviño has argued that the
presence of lawyers signals mistrust, and signals that the reforms are the product of external
compulsion; legal training also results in a focus on narrow, legalistic, compliance approach
as opposed to a “values approach.” Linda Klebe Treviño et al., Managing Ethics and Legal
Compliance: What Works and What Hurts, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV. 131 (1999). Contra Sturm,
supra note 63, at 527-30 (applauding, through example, lawyers’ ability to develop “flexible,
accountable” remedies aimed at reform).
184
This is a topic for another paper, but one must recognize the serious resource inequalities
between the firm, the individual, and the Third Party that will exist in the Reform
Undertaking process. Richard Stewart has suggested that in the twenty-first century,
new forms of administrative law will be developed to address the distinctive issues
presented by the new network and economic incentive methods of regulation . . . .
Formal legal procedures, backed by judicial review, will be targeted toward
protecting private rights from particularized applications of regulatory power,
although there may be renewed scope for tort law as well.
Stewart, supra note 73, at 454. See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1371 (2003) (arguing that current state action doctrine is inadequate to
address the constitutional challenge presented by privatization).
185
See cf. Sturm, supra note 62, at 1413 (arguing, in the context of courts, that such a dual
role creates an appearance of unfairness, and prevents a full articulation of the normative
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same satisficing that characterizes the pre-settlement Enforcement process
does not characterize the True Reform Undertaking process. There should
be no attorney-client privilege between firm and Third Party, since this
promotes information hoarding and prevents comparative learning.186 The
Third Party’s report should speak not only to areas where there was
considerable success, but also to those inevitable areas where compromises
were reached, or roadblocks were encountered. The information should be
capable of being aggregated—it should be set out in a sufficiently organized
form that others can learn from it, and the Commission can compare one
result to another. At the same time, conscious attention should go to
ensuring that there does not emerge a reporting “orthodoxy” that causes
different firms to reach the same conclusions, not independently because
they are good ideas, but rather through mimicry with a view to satisfying the
Commission in the least intensive way. Third Parties are not expected to
reinvent the wheel—quite the contrary—but they should be prepared to
demonstrate that they have given independent thought to the particular
place, processes, and people before them.
Obviously this is challenging work, but real success is far from
impossible. Enforcement action (buttressed as needed by additional
enforcement “sticks”) is virtually the only way to put such a challenging yet
promising investigative process in motion at a worst-acting firm.
The Need for a Center
Even if the Third Party succeeds in creating a Reform Undertaking
process that can negotiate the pitfalls of collective self-reflection in this
charged situation, progress will remain ad hoc and accidental without
coordinating insights from other successful Reform Undertaking processes.
On the aggregate level, as well, the SEC needs a mechanism that can
compare one firm’s response to another’s, both to make the process credible
and to augment Enforcement learning. Information capture represents one
of the real benefits of using Reform Undertakings over less transparent
settlement mechanisms.
Conversely, a failure of good information
processes significantly undermines the structure’s promise.
Thus, the True Reform Undertaking approach should be reinforced
by the active presence of a centralized data clearinghouse: i.e., an
information-gathering and learning structure that aggregates information on

reasons underlying the adoption of a particular remedy). In this respect, the fact that little
public information has emerged on the SEC’s response to Third Parties’ final reports is
worrying.
186
Appropriately, the more recent Reform Undertakings stipulate that there shall be no
attorney-client relationship between firm and Third Party. See, e.g., supra notes 142, 143.

Page 58 of 72

the progress being made in these worst cases.187 Progress should be
measured by reference to high-level impacts and outcomes, not just
outputs.188 The clearinghouse function also serves a social signaling
purpose. Deterrence, on its own, sends a message of seriousness about
corporate wrongdoing. However, having a clearinghouse that can evaluate
success in changing corporate culture sends a much deeper message of
seriousness, and makes it clear that facial compliance or other mechanisms
for short-circuiting the change process will not be tolerated.
The clearinghouse must focus on best practices among Reform
Undertakers, rather than “industry standards” or rigid rules. This gives
Enforcement the ability to define the ends to be achieved by comparison to
other examples, and to challenge failing firms and their Third Parties to
investigate the methods, and meet the achievements, of their peers. In
addition to providing Enforcement with standards by which to measure
progress, valid centralized data gives both firms and their Third Parties more
information, helping them to learn simultaneously from their own
experience, and others’. The clearinghouse would be in a position to
mandate that firms and Third Parties maintain careful records, and record
data in a way that permits aggregation with other data (from other firms and
elsewhere), which helps predict potential problems and identify systemic
weaknesses. It should develop comparison matrices, and settling firms
could be required to develop and make data available in that form as an
additional settlement condition. Measured performance improvement would
have to be a presumptive condition for lifting True Reform Undertaking
conditions.189
187

Several New Governance scholars agree on the need for a centralized data management
“clearinghouse.” See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 64, at 345-56 (calling for agencies to
engage in benchmarking, or “comparative evaluations” of one another, in order to ultimately
achieve best practices); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale,
Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 189, 222-25 (2002) (advocating that
different levels of government “pool” their information in order to “build a richer collective
understanding . . . of [a] problem”); Sturm, supra note 152, at 9. See also SPARROW, supra
note 75, at 167-68 (expressing a desire for agency’s to “organize the lessons they learn and to
make the accumulated knowledge readily available”).
188
See WILSON, supra note 83, at 161-62. This is not to say that identifying convincing
outcome indicators for intangibles like the “culture of compliance” will be easy. Tracking
high-level impacts and outcomes is notoriously difficult, though not impossible. See
SPARROW, supra note 75, at 109-22, 281-92 (giving real-world examples of agencies’
frustrations in attempting to make such measurements, and suggesting a strategy to solve
problems). On the other hand, the difficulty of measuring such concepts does not change the
fact that they are, in fact, the outcomes that need to be measured to determine a program’s
success. Nor is the problem unique to the Reform Undertaking situation.
189
Because of its situation within the enforcement context, there will never be as much room
in my model for parties’ own articulation of novel governance standards as there is in the
most wide-ranging versions of experimentalism. See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 64, at
404-07. Settling firms must be able to revise what constitutes “good governance,” and to
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Crucially, a best practices regime (or “rolling best practices
rulemaking”) forces better learning by firms. Without conscious, outcomebased analysis, institutional responses to the coercive Undertaking
mechanism may produce imitative isomorphism between firms, based not
on that firm’s internal investigation and considered response but rather on
mimicry of other previously-approved compliance programs.190 Because the
relationship between rule and response is reciprocal, industry practices in
Reform Undertakings can become the basis of enforced legal norms for
subsequent firms for no better reason than that others have used them.191
The risk of “missing the mark” with any particular firm (and consequently,
the risk of recidivism) increases to the extent that the received wisdom on
how to navigate through the Reform Undertaking process, perhaps based on
replicated industry standards and imperfect information about how a specific
firm operates, misaligns the Undertaking response with root causes of
wrongdoing. Institutional learning by regulators is curtailed, and regulatory
thinking is constrained. By contrast, best practices standards are a
continually evolving standard, which limits the parties’ ability to satisfice
for facial compliance.192
The SEC’s new Office of Risk Management, established in 2004, is
the place for the clearinghouse function. Its staff is tasked with gathering
and maintaining data on new trends and risks from a variety of sources, such
as external experts, domestic and foreign agencies, surveys, focus groups,
and other market data, including both buy-side and sell-side research. The
Office of Risk Management also analyzes data to identify and assess new
areas of concern across professions, companies, industries, and markets; and
preparing assessments and forecasts on the agency’s risk environment.193
make a case for trying out novel compliance mechanisms, but their proposals would have to
meet the approval of the SEC so long as they were operating within the Reform Undertaking
timeline. They would have to make their case quite compellingly, given their limited
credibility in Enforcement eyes.
190
DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 55, at 66-67, 69-70.
191
See, e.g., Lauren Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The
Expansion of Due Process in the Workplace, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1401 (1990) (arguing that
industry elaborations on broad equal protection requirements become the basis for courtdefined “industry standards,” constituting the statutory mandate for subsequent industry
actors).
192
See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 64, at 354-56 (describing “rolling best practices
rulemaking”); Sabel & Simon, supra note 62, at 1074-75 (describing the “Veil Effect”).
Obviously the presence of the words “best practices” in a firm’s compliance manual does not
mean that best practices are observed. See, e.g., supra note 20. This observation only
reinforces the need for a meaningful clearinghouse function.
193
See William H. Donaldson, Testimony Concerning Regulatory Reforms To Protect Our
Nation's Mutual Fund Investors Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs (Nov. 18, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts111803whd.htm
(canvassing the components of the new “risk management initiative”). This discussion is
also compatible with the SEC’s latest Strategic Plan, which focuses more explicitly on risk

Page 60 of 72

The Office is an overarching body, not situated within Enforcement.194 It is
structured around “internal risk teams in a ‘bottom-up’ approach for each
major program area.” The Office will coordinate those teams with a view to
anticipation and early identification of potential problem areas, or illegal or
questionable activities, across the securities industry.195 The work of the
Office of Risk Assessment is complemented by a Risk Management
Committee, whose primary responsibility is to review the implications of
identified risks and recommend an appropriate course of action.196 The key
challenge, as the risk management function defines itself, will be for it to
actively develop rolling best practices rules as a basis for forcing
accountability within the True Reform Undertaking process.
Ramifying Back to the Enforcer
As Jim Liebman observed in a different context, no one chose to
create a prosecutorial system that seemingly rewards horse-trading and
scapegoating, facial but meaningless compliance structures, and insensitivity
to prosecutors’ inability to handle the massive volume of information they
face.197 In identifying the prospect of spurring institutional reform of firm
assessment and data analysis, and the quality of internal agency functioning, than any plan to
date. According to the Plan, the information coming from the risk assessment process will
also be used to make the SEC’s enforcement pyramid more informed and rational in its
resource allocation:
[s]uch risk assessment techniques also will help the SEC focus its examination and
disclosure review programs. In identifying firms and filings to examine, the
Commission is shifting away from a “one size fits all” review cycle to new risk-based
approaches that direct resources toward those firms, issuers, filings, or industries that
most warrant review.
SEC 2004-09 Strategic Plan, supra note 87, at 25.
194
The clearinghouse should not be too closely tied to Enforcement. The SEC must be in a
position to pronounce the success or failure of each Reform Undertaking, but involving
Enforcement in data-gathering reintroduces inefficiencies. It also raises the risk that
Enforcement will assume command-and-control style management of the processes, or will
be unduly influenced by its own self interest in seeing the Reform Undertaking method work
relative to other non-Enforcement initiatives.
195
See Press Release, SEC, Charles Fishkin Named Director of SEC's New Office of Risk
Assessment (July 1, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-92.htm
(describing the recenlty formed Office of Risk Assessment as responsible for managing and
“coordinating risk assessment activities across the agency”).
196
See Donaldson, supra note 193.
197
See Liebman, supra note 130, at 2155-56. See also William J. Stuntz, The Pathological
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 523 (2001) (arguing that criminal law-aswritten differs substantially from criminal law-as-enforced as a result of incentives for and
politics between legislators, prosecutors, and judges, and warning that “the law’s messages
are likely to be buried, swamped by local variation and hard-to-discern arrest patterns, by
low-visibility guilty pleas and even lower-visibility decisions to decline prosecution”).
MICHAEL LEVI, REGULATING FRAUD: WHITE-COLLAR CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
(1987) (arguing that white collar criminal law and law enforcement in the United Kingdom is
more the product of sporadic and irrational political forces than rational planning).
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culture, and in recognizing its own institutional limitations in achieving that
goal, SEC Enforcement may have succeeded above all in charting a path
toward its own reform. Recent scandals across financial sectors, followed
by Enforcement scrambling to demonstrate its own continued relevance to
problems of culture, has brought the clear incapacity of Enforcement’s
processes into sharp relief and suggested new reformative possibilities.
Seen this way, the SEC may only now be catching up with innovations in
enforcement at other administrative agencies, where the utter failure of the
command-and-control administrative model (not an issue in the disclosurebased securities regulation context) began to force change more than a
decade ago.198
Enforcement behavior, like prosecutorial behavior more generally,
is a product of its own structure and processes, and that structure will create
its own context-specific effects.199 What an employer measures and rewards
will have an effect on outcomes and employee behavior. Thus, Enforcement
staff should be trained to identify key elements of a forward-looking,
transparent, and accountable remedial scheme, to be distinguished from
resolutions that achieve case closure at the expense of other values,
including due process to individuals or broader corporate citizenship norms.
Individual Enforcement staff should be rewarded to the extent that their own
decisions are demonstrably as information-based and systemically justified
198

During the 1990s, enforcement functions in agencies such as Customs, the IRS, and OSHA
began to develop their own vocabulary, focused on risk reduction, which incorporated the
problem solving, results-oriented, data-intensive and industry-collaborative characteristics of
New Governance regulation. For a history of 1990s (non-SEC) administrative enforcement
reform, see generally SPARROW, supra note 75. Sparrow’s empirical research across
regulatory bodies found that three common elements characterized the best new enforcement
structures as of the year 2000: (1) a clear focus on results—not in terms of process or quotas,
but based on an expanded and more specific set of indicators including “big picture” Mission
Statement-level impacts, behavioral outcomes such as compliance rates, agency activities,
and outputs, and resource efficiency; (2) adoption of a disciplined problem solving approach
based on systematic identification and prioritization of important risks or patterns of
noncompliance, a flexible and functional project-based approach, and periodic outcome
evaluation with flexible resource allocation based on outcomes; (3) selective investment in
collaborative partnerships. Sparrow suggests (as I do here) that partnership with bad actors
may be more important in achieving results. Supra note 75, at 103-08.
199See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and their Agents, Agents and their Prosecutors, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 749, 758-87 (2003) (pointing out that structural and administrative factors
influence the exercise of prosecutorial discretion). The SEC’s latest Strategic Plan is striking
for its use of risk-analytical and outcome-oriented methods, especially by comparison to prior
Strategic Plan documents. Compare SEC 2004-09 Strategic Plan, supra note 87, with SEC,
1999 Annual Performance Report/2001 Annual Performance Plan (February 2000), at
http://www.sec.gov/about/gpra1999-2000.shtml. The earlier SEC document, although it
outlines six “preliminary” high level outcomes, describes 1999 Performance almost entirely
in terms of outputs (number of enforcement actions brought, number of financial statements
reviewed, number of SRO rules reviewed, etc.), and does not take an overarching risk
analysis approach.
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as the good governance requirements they impose on firms.200 The same
standards of credibility and transparency that characterize the True Reform
Undertaking process should characterize problem solving at Enforcement.
Actually, reworking Enforcement staff incentives to reward
transparency and demonstrably reasoned decision-making is the easy part.
The larger challenge for Enforcement will be to imagine a global approach
to securities law enforcement that remains healthily skeptical, liabilityconscious and closure-permitting, yet shows greater responsiveness to the
strictures under which real-world enforcement operates, and the magnitude
of the challenge of spurring widespread institutional reform. New
Governance theory offers a theoretical structure for making sense of the
Reform Undertaking in both normative and efficiency-based terms. In
return, the creative action of enforcement personnel in practice is a reminder
to New Governance theorists not to underestimate either the necessity or the
creative potential of the enforcement role.
Enforcement has its own purpose. It is not a court, a corporate
governance consultant, or a rulemaking administrative body. This is not to
say that, to the extent that Enforcement action can spur long term changes in
firm behavior, we should fetishize the distinction between regulation and
enforcement.201 The challenge in regulation is to identify how each actor
can leverage its unique qualities of place and purpose to permit learning and
wise, context-specific, impact-aware problem solving. It requires the actor
in question to understand the purposes it is trying to achieve, and to learn
from its own experience.

200

The SEC’s latest Strategic Plan emphasizes the need to “sustain and improve
organizational excellence.” The Plan announces a new continuing education program, new
performance measurement systems, and a new Pay for Performance system for individual
employees. SEC 2004-09 Strategic Plan, supra note 87, at 26-27. The SEC should include
credit for innovative solutions that circumvent organizational limitations in performance
metrics. See also SPARROW, supra note 75, at 168 (recommending rewards for employees’
successful problem solving efforts).
201
Consider Mr. Cutler’s recent comments:
As an enforcement lawyer, I am quite familiar with the complaint, often raised by
defendants or respondents, and even by an occasional SEC Commissioner, that a
proposed settlement amounts to rulemaking by enforcement. While I’m confident
that we hear that argument far more often than warranted, it points up that an
enforcement proceeding can, in fact, realign an industry standard. That is, when
faced with the risks and costs of litigating an enforcement action, some parties may
agree in settlement to change or restrict their future conduct in significant and farreaching ways.
Stephen M. Cutler, Remarks, After The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Future of The Mandatory
Disclosure System (Feb. 21, 2003), in 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 545, 552 (2003).

Page 63 of 72

5. Toward a New Enforcement Model
Forward-looking, reform-oriented regulatory structures can and do
function within traditional Enforcement structures. Understanding this
hybridity requires some elaboration.
Three points seem especially
relevant.202 First, one would not want to lose, through a novel enforcement
approach, Enforcement’s unique structural advantages. Certain elements of
the enforcement model—primarily the reliance on temporary, task-specific
teams and context-specific remedies—give enforcers an edge over other
regulators in devising good responses to problems among public companies
and regulated entities. Second, one must be prepared to imagine that a
flexible, learning-by-doing structure can exist embedded within a more
traditional adversarial one. Finally, the advantages of nesting New
Governance experimentation within coercion can be significant, because it
allows Enforcement staff to rely on the full range of behavior-modifying
mechanisms, from shaming through information-forcing experimentalist
remedies.
Structural Advantages
Perhaps surprisingly, certain aspects of the Enforcement function
seem to mesh more naturally with New Governance mechanisms than do
those mainstream regulatory functions that adapted the new methods first.
To begin with, Enforcement mechanisms naturally work from the
specific to the general, rather than the other way around. Enforcement staff
is tasked with responding to the empirical evidence from a particular case,
and this spares them some of the clumsy overreaching of the under-informed
rule-maker. Indeed, as the history of New Governance initiatives has
shown, command-and-control regulators have struggled to develop
mechanisms to absorb and learn from the kind of information that flows
continually and easily to Enforcement (a fact that causes one to wonder why
enforcement divisions have not been central information-gathering tools for
modern regulators across the board.)
Second, compared to mainstream regulators, enforcement teams are
flexible and temporary. Law and practice have allowed them to operate
relatively free of bureaucratic process obligations, and they are more likely
to be immune to bureaucratic sclerosis: i.e., the accretive process and
personnel commitments that make quick response capability difficult to
202

My focus is on the Reform Undertaking as straddling device between New Governance
and traditional enforcement models. Many other important elements of building a new
enforcement model are beyond this paper’s scope—how Enforcement ought to nominate and
select firms for Reform Undertakings, and how Enforcement should allocate resources to
individual projects. See generally SPARROW, supra note 75, at 155-70 (describing
components of a “problem solving infrastructure”).
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maintain over time.203 Enforcement managers can choose the right people,
internal and external, for the job at hand. They can disband the teams when
the job is complete, and they can have a new team coalesce for the next
round without fear of flouting internal agency protocols. To some degree,
shifting team composition can prevent ingrained distrust from building up
between parties, even where the temporary team members continue to come
from a pool of Enforcement staff. Because of their one-case-at-a-time
orientation, the remedies that temporary teams develop (staffers and firms in
drafting Reform Undertaking terms, and Third Parties and firms in
effectuating them) can be tailored to the facts at hand. Enforcement can
experiment with multiple possible solutions at once, across short timelines,
and try to force very discrete kinds of action in the hope of catalyzing a
broader compliance cascade.
Third, largely due to resource constraints, Enforcement practice is
accustomed to decentralizing the investigatory and learning processes to the
firm being investigated. We have discussed the attendant risks above, but
the practice also has the advantage of leaving some degree of agency with
the industry actors themselves. From this position, it is an extrapolation,
rather than a complete change of direction, to work on achieving
endogenous firm learning and norm generation.
Finally, and importantly, enforcers have no choice but to be
outcome-oriented, in that that they are tasked with finding solutions to
specific problems. Enforcement concentrates on taking action, and doing so
with respect to the worst actors in the system. Regulators may be tempted to
focus on the most enlightened members of the regulated community, or to
highlight “gold star” companies to demonstrate the wisdom of their policies.
We should not forget that regulatory regimes operate within a larger
political system, and that regulators can be responsive to political pressures.
In contrast, frontline Enforcement staff have no choice but to try to do
something about intransigent actors and intractable problems. In this
respect, so long as they are not allowed to take shortcuts in the form of
credit-for-facial-compliance or credit-for-cooperation, Enforcement staff’s
on-the-ground actions can have as much impact, though in a different way,
as the broadest legislative responses. For all of these reasons, as well as for
the special constraints under which enforcers operate, the particular nature
of enforcement action deserves closer study than it has received from New
Governance scholars thus far.

203

See Stewart, supra note 74, at 440-42, 446-48 (describing events resulting in regulatory
process “fatigue” in recent decades).
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Embedding New Governance
The conflict between firm welfare and investor protection is a
mixed-motive situation.204 That is, over the long term, SEC Enforcement’s
interests and the firm’s interests are neither purely cooperative nor purely
competitive. By pulling the reformative project away from the liabilityoriented one, the Reform Undertaking creates a space within which the
parties can transcend adversarial win/lose dichotomies and concentrate on
specific, achievable steps that can serve both long term investor protection
and long term firm flourishing. The Reform Undertaking, as introduced by
SEC Enforcement, represents a significant new approach to securities law
enforcement. It contradicts the stereotype of enforcement personnel as stuck
in an outmoded, adversarial, almost actively anti-reformative posture.205
Bifurcating the problem solving remedy from the liability stage also
allows Enforcement’s reform aspirations and its non-delegable mandate to
coexist. It embeds the reformative project within a still-viable prosecutorial
function. There are costs at the margins, in that the firm’s problem solving
process will probably not be completely free of a coercive taint. However,
the comparison should be to other existing alternatives, not to an idealized
problem solving technique. At a minimum, the Reform Undertaking
process holds out the possibility of catalyzing an endogenous reformative
process within a firm—a possibility that is largely precluded by credit-forcompliance and credit-for-cooperation settlement arrangements, and that
may never be more than an accidental byproduct of massive deterrence.
Perhaps one of the most exciting questions is how far back one can push the
reformative project: i.e., whether the presence of an open and iterative
remedy at the back end can give the SEC the comfort to rejig its modus
operandi at the front end—moving away from both overly rigid-butenforceable rules in Enforcement, and underspecified-thus-costly
prophylactic standards in regulation.206 One might hope for a new form of
governance, emanating from Enforcement’s Reform Undertakings, that
marries a high-level, standards-based understanding of compliance with the
flexible and evolving yet specific architecture necessary to make those
standards meaningful. Further, one might hope for it under what is likely to
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See generally RICHARD WALTON & ROBERT MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR
NEGOTIATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF A SOCIAL INTERACTION SYSTEM (1965) (interpreting
practices in labor-management negotiations in light of behavioral theory).
205
See supra note 79. This is even more the case when speaking of criminal prosecutors’
similar innovations. See supra notes 6, 11.
206
It is a harder project to ramify the learning all the way back to Congress, which also
promulgates broad prophylactic requirements.
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be the outcome-oriented and industry-focused, decentralized leadership of
Chairman Cox.207
The Reform Undertaking also serves as an optimistic
counterexample to those who worry that adversarialism and entrenched
interests inevitably consume or undermine fragile experimentalist
processes.208 Relative to situations lower on the enforcement pyramid,
enforcement is the least hospitable environment for New Governance
solutions. Mutual trust between the parties is substantially lacking. Past
efforts at voluntary compliance with law have demonstrably failed. The
primary actors in this scenario—Enforcement staff on one hand, and firm on
the other—are operating in a high-stakes, adversarial, potentially punitive
environment. This is not a benign “laboratory for democracy,” and one
party is in a position to impose sanctions on the other.209 Costs are clear,
and high. Nevertheless, Enforcement staff, on its own initiative and
operating in its adversarial stance, has sketched out a structure that gives the
worst actors in its regulated universe an opportunity to transcend that acute
adversarial situation, through a reformist experiment.
Remedial Agnosticism
Experimentalism in its pure theoretical form might eschew the
blaming/punitive component of enforcement in favor of prospective steps
directed at future reform,210 but I argue for the continued utility of, and
theoretical justification for, a full range of legal responses. When dealing
with the worst actors, the central concern must be what seems to work, most
consistently and demonstrably, in effecting the sought-after change.
207

One set of observers has commented on the striking way in which the current presidential
administration, through its emphasis on decentralization and accountability in government
programs, may have put into motion an unexpectedly vast re-evaluation of public responses
to systemic problems, far beyond those programs’ intended mandate. They argue that,
despite its many deficiencies, this may be the case with the No Child Left Behind Act in
education. See James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, The Federal No Child Left Behind Act
and the Post-Desegregation Civil Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1703 (2003).
208
See MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 168-72 (2003) (urging caution
against, but nonetheless advocating, “democratic experimentalism” because of its nascent
status, its unknown outcomes, and its questionable effectiveness); Tushnet, New Institutional
Structures of Governance and American Political Development, in NEW GOVERNANCE AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 81 (manuscript at 18-20, on file with author) (observing that
traditional national interest groups, such as teachers’ unions, may obstruct experimentalist
programs).
209
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country”).
210
See Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly Deliberative Polyarchy, 3 EUR. L. J. 313
(1997); Dorf & Sabel, supra note 64, at 336-39, 348-51.
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I share the conviction that New Governance-style participatory
problem solving processes are a most promising mechanism for spurring
institutional reform. This does not mean that one should hope for a deeply
effective process to emerge spontaneously. While New Governance puts
actor agency at the core of its program, it is not a voluntary compliance
model. Most New Governance theorists would agree that in the regulatory
context, a coercive “stick” is essential to making an enforcement pyramid
function.211 Significantly, this is a stick of a different kind than that
presented by the fear of massive one-time monetary sanctions. It is
information-forcing and participation-forcing over a longer period of time
relative to a traditional enforcement action, and is directed at stimulating the
kind of bottom-up change that is more likely to be sustained and selfreinforcing. When dealing with actors that require a “nudge” in the right
direction, New Governance regulation (here, in the person of the Third
Party) steps up inspections and sets comparative benchmarks to challenge
the firm to face and respond to its own deficiencies in processes and
outcomes.212 Firms can be expected to want less regulatory interference in
their daily operations. Thus, in situations where something like an
experimentalist system is up and running, one can theoretically give firms
incentives to improve by stipulating that good behavior (in the form of
demonstrated good practices and internal learning) leads to greater
autonomy, and bad behavior leads to greater scrutiny.213 One may anticipate
a cascade effect as a critical mass of firms in a particular industry begin to
observe good practices, to share information, and to put in place
mechanisms that allow them to self-reflect.
This paper’s concern is for what happens when the necessary
mindset has not emerged and shows no signs of emerging among certain
industry actors. In other words, the question is what happens when, even if
the need to do something seems clear and urgent to outsiders or to some of
the parties involved, other key parties are resistant and even hostile to
211

See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 35-41; John Braithwaite, Institutionalizing
Distrust, Enculturating Trust, in TRUST AND GOVERNANCE 343, 356 (Valerie A. Braithwaite
et al., eds., 1998) (); Karkkainen, supra note 159; Karkkainen, supra note 63, at 485-89
(rejecting a model of New Governance that obviates any need for “hardness” in the law);
Sabel & Simon, supra note 62, at 1067 n.154 (recognizing that the threat of sanctions is a
“key function . . . [in] forc[ing] to the table a party who otherwise might not be willing to
negotiate at all”); Archon Fung et al., The Political Economy of Transparency: What Makes
Disclosure Policies Sustainable? Institute for Government Innovation 41-42 (OPS 02-03), at
http://www.innovations.harvard.edu/research/papers/FGW.pdf (asserting that enforcement is
a central component of New Governance).
212
See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 64, at 336-39 (recognizing that “firms often turn to third
parties to organize benchmarking”).
213
It makes sense to speak specifically of experimentalism in this section. Among New
Governance approaches, experimentalism provides the most completely imagined description
of incentive systems for ratcheting up best-practices learning among decentralized groups.
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reform efforts.214 Some firms and even some industries may be too
pathological or dysfunctional, and their own stories about themselves too
entrenched, to be pulled in through experimentalist incentives. A system
that presumes a certain base level of capacity and bona fides among industry
actors will find no initial purchase among the worst actors. New
Governance theory would respond by shutting the intransigent firm down.
The top end of the New Governance enforcement pyramid is the “penalty
default.”
It is a harsh result, suboptimal for all parties (including
shareholders and employees), which operates as a default outcome in the
event that Enforcement and firm fail to reach a satisfactory
accommodation.215 In practical terms, this means that SEC Enforcement
retains the right and the means to destroy or shut down the noncompliant
firm.216 To function as intended, however, the default option must be
credible. Enforcers must be willing, in extreme cases, to allow the default
option to play itself out.217

214

It is thought that new forms of experimentalist governance are most likely to emerge in
circumstances where both ends and means are disputed, and yet there is a collective sense of
urgency about the need to do something. Without knowing how frequently those conditions
prevail, or how close to ideal conditions one must get before experimentalism starts to gain
momentum, we can agree that those conditions are not obviously present in every situation
that calls for institutional reform.
215
See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (coining the term “penalty default” in the
context of contract theory); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and
Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 965-83
(2003) (introducing the “regulatory penalty default” in the environmental context). Penalty
defaults are likely to prove especially useful in contexts where, due to a high degree of local
variability, the best results are highly fact and context specific. Id. at 977. This applies to
institutional corporate governance reform as well. Karkkainen worries about rent-seeking
agencies and whether the need for an objective third party to impose the penalty default are
also apropos. Id. at 938-90.
216
E.g., through punitive fines forcing the firm into bankruptcy. In bringing even a successful
civil fraud conviction against a firm in federal court, the SEC triggers other federal statutes
that may make it difficult for the corporation to continue as a going concern. See, e.g., the
Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 9.406 – 407 (2005) barring or suspending a firm
from obtaining federal government procurement contracts. Reputational effects, private
securities litigation, and (less commonly) state business charter revocation may also follow
on the heels of an SEC investigation and force a company into bankruptcy. The SEC also
cooperates with criminal prosecutors on the most serious cases.
217
I am not suggesting that giving regulators the power to shut down noncompliant actors is
unique to New Governance theory; far from it. I mean that the penalty default is an integral
component of the enforcement pyramid structure that informs the New Governance approach
to enforcement. In fact, even the idea of an enforcement pyramid has deep roots in securities
regulation. As William Orville Douglas stated decades ago, government’s role in regulating
finance was to “keep the shotgun . . . behind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for
use but with the hope that it would never be used.” W.O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND
FINANCE 82 (James Allen ed., 1940).
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The penalty default is a necessary part of any enforcement scheme,
but it should operate as a last resort. Except when dealing with utterly
criminal organizations, public interest considerations argue against
destroying publicly held, wealth-creating, and job-providing organizations,
even where they may be quite flawed in governance terms. Nevertheless,
there may be considerable space between the penalty default option and the
point at which experimentalist learning necessarily will take hold. For this
reason, other options, including the use of traditional enforcement sanctions,
should be considered before enforcement’s worst-case-scenario is allowed
to play itself out.218
In fact, prosecution in all its forms can focus the mind. A True
Reform Undertaking, embedded within and buttressed by deterrent
sanctions, shaming, selective business line shutdown,219 individual liability,
disgorgement or restitution, and any number of other enforcement options
can be the bridge between the worst actor and the abyss. Shaming and
blaming can serve a forward-looking purpose as well as a retrospective
one.220 Public liability determinations, too, affect a firm’s reputational
218

Some experimentalist work does envision spurring reform through graduated traditional
sanctions. E.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 68. Thus far, this avenue is underdeveloped. This
project moves beyond the drug treatment court model in note 68 in the following ways: it is
concerned with the actions of enforcement personnel, not a specialized but still arm’s length
court. As such it must address the complicated strategic environment of settlement, rather
than picking up the narrative after the subject individual has already pled guilty. As well,
problems of responsibility, causation, and remedy are substantially more complex for the
regulator when addressing institutional culture rather than individual drug-related law
violations. While the drug treatment court model focuses on the court as experimentalist
organ, this project is preoccupied with spurring a decentralized experimentalist process
within settling firms, producing a subsequent feedback effect on SEC Enforcement. The
absence of a court structure at the center of this project makes it more challenging,
contingent, and complex, but also more reflective of actual securities law enforcement
practice.
219
This is one of the options being considered by the New York Stock Exchange. See supra,
note 28.
220
Two scholars making this point, essentially on expressive grounds, are Schlegel and
Braithwaite. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989) (arguing
that public condemnation and shaming can have a reintegrative and community-affirming
effect on law violators and those affected by them); SCHLEGEL, supra note 13 (arguing that
punishing corporations sends an important message of social condemnation distinct from any
subsequent general deterrent effects). New Governance scholars have pointed out important
differences between the profile of a retrospective, liability-allocating model and the
imperatives inherent in a remedial, or otherwise more prospective and problem solving,
model. There may be a tendency to overdraw the distinction in the interest of making it
visible. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 81 (contrasting “mainstream jurisprudence” with
“Toyota Production System as jurisprudential phenomenon”). In any remedial process
arising out of a finding that the organization’s previous practices are unacceptable,
allocations of liability will leave an impression on subsequent events. Forward-looking
remedial problem solving mechanisms are, of course, different from retrospective liability
determinations, but those involved in the problem solving will not (and should not be
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capital. Network effects in business relations flow from and often reinforce
the shaming effect of public sanction.221 If firms believe that the adverse
consequences for failing at the Reform Undertaking stage will be swift,
significant, and certain, then even unreconstructed “old school”
Enforcement action may get people moving.222 Some of these options may
be necessary, if insufficient, components of a comprehensive coercive
reform-spurring process.
In this way the line between deterrence and reform generation blurs,
reminding us of the danger of overdrawing that distinction. None of this
undermines the promise of the New Governance approach: it does not say
that sanctions work and New Governance is epiphenomenal. What it does
say is that New Governance-inflected approaches to reforming firm culture
can work, especially when reinforced by consequences for failure.223 While
alternate sanctioning effects will impose some costs on the problem solving
process, the only way to determine whether the costs are worth running is to
set up a mechanism by which the SEC can monitor and evaluate the Reform
Undertaking structure in practice. This brings us full circle. In focusing on
reforming firm culture, and in taking the first steps toward incorporating
New Governance style remedies into its approach, SEC Enforcement may
have charted a path toward its own institutional reform.

Postscript: A Different Kind of Governance
This paper identifies some dangers of over-abstraction in discussing
governance. Securities law enforcement is a system that attempts to protect
investors and allocate responsibility for past wrongdoing, veined through
with other values such as efficiency, retributivism, the search for political
capital, and the market pressure toward closure. Moreover, who enforces
the principles—be it courts, the actors themselves, or some third party—is at
expected to) operate as though history and liability were irrelevant. On the contrary, one of
the key functions of the problem solving process will be to make sense of the organization’s
collective history.
221
See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
222
Commissioner Glassman has said:
[T]here is no question that fear is a potent motivator. Therefore, if fear of an
investigation or enforcement action motivates board directors and executives to
make sure that their companies are complying with the spirit and the letter of the
securities laws, that's OK with me – just as long as the result is that people are
encouraged to, and in fact, do the right thing.
Commissioner Cynthia A. Glassman, Speech at the Practicing Law Institute: My Top 10
Observations as an SEC Commissioner (Mar. 5, 2004), at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch030504cag.htm.
223
See also TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002) (arguing that even while police compel
obedience through the threat or use of force, they can also gain the cooperation of people
with whom they deal if they behave in procedurally fair ways).
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least as integral to how and whether it will work as is the theoretical
distinction between New Governance and other methods. It is only likely to
work where all parties believe that they will be accountable, through
transparent processes, to a larger audience than they can control.
The securities law enforcement example is a lesson in the value of
contextual analysis and open-minded examination, not only as a theoretical
matter relevant to regulators but also as an imperative for those of us that
write about them. Innovations are taking place, perhaps unexpectedly for
New Governance scholars, in the interstices of securities law enforcement
practice. They risk going unnoticed by those most pessimistic about the
enforcement model’s limitations, or most committed to the bright line
between retrospective, liability-oriented mechanisms and prospective,
remedial-stage problem solving ones.
This paper does not propose final solutions, and it leaves some
questions unanswered. Yet, it argues that a coherent hybridity between
experimentalism and securities law enforcement structures can, and should,
exist. In presenting the differences between existing settlement approaches
and the new Reform Undertaking model, the right questions, from the
perspectives of justice, accountability, market health, and investor
protection, have been raised.
Even more significantly, in trying on the Reform Undertaking
approach, SEC Enforcement has opened the door to further developing its
own, unique expression of New Governance style learning in the particular
enforcement universe within which it operates. In its best form, the
powerful combination of enforcement and New Governance contains the
potential to transform not only the way the SEC deals with the worst actors,
but also the way it structures itself. These are exciting developments that
will bear watching.
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